

Metaphorical route to unexpected content:

- (1) The people of Crotona live in the arch of the Italian boot.
- (2) It was Grand Central Station around here this morning.

Walton: "Where in Italy is the town of Crotona? I ask. You explain that it is on the arch of the Italian boot. 'See that thundercloud over there – the big, angry face near the horizon,' you say...It is by thinking of Italy or the thundercloud...as potential if not actual props that I understand where Crotona is, which cloud is the one being talked about" ("Metaphor & Prop-Oriented Make Believe," 40-41)

Presuppositional route to unexpected content:

- (3) The King is in the counting house.
- (4) My cousin is not a boy anymore.

Stalnaker: "If there is no one person who is presupposed to fit the description, then reference fails (even if some person does in fact fit the description uniquely). But if there is one, then it makes no difference whether that presupposition is true or false. The presupposition helps to determine the proposition expressed, but once the proposition is determined, it can stand alone." (*Context and Content*, 43)

Mapping the metaphorical route; "piggybacking on a pretense"

(M) S 's real content, in the context of game γ , is the R such that for all X , $\gamma(X)$ includes S iff X includes R – the props need to be in condition R to put S into the game's content.

Graphically: The semantic content of sentence S (let ' S ' stand for both) is a region in logical space, represented by the yellow bar across the top of **Figure 1**. S calls to mind a game γ , which is the function represented by the blue arrow. S and γ together induce a real content R . How? R = the minimal input to function γ that ensures S is part of the output. That is indicated by putting R at the tail of the blue game-arrow whose head points to S . R emerges as something like the inverse image of S under γ . That's **Figure 2**.

Suppose "the Metropolitan Museum borrows a portrait of Napoleon from the Louvre...and has it shipped to New York on the Queen Mary...one might observe that Napoleon is a 'passenger' on the Queen Mary, thus invoking a possible game in which the presence of a portrait on a ship makes it fictional that the subject of the portrait is a passenger" (41). S = *Napoleon is a passenger on the Queen Mary*. The yellow region is S 's semantic content: the worlds where Napoleon is on board. The red region contains the R -worlds: the ones where S is pretense-worthy because Napoleon is portrayed by a portrait on the ship. There is overlap because Napoleon could be delivering the portrait himself.

Mapping the presuppositional route; "pivoting on a presupposition"

Our problem is to determine the real content R on the basis of S and π (see Figure 3). How do we extrapolate the bit of the S -region that's in π – the green square in the upper left – into the rest of logical space? Here is a line of reasoning about this that seems natural.

- 1) S 's real content is what it *says* as opposed to presupposing.
- 2) What it says is what S *adds* to π
- 3) R is what S adds to π iff R is what sets S -worlds apart *in the π -region*.
- 4) R is what sets S -worlds apart in the π -region iff it meets two conditions.

(AGREEMENT) *within* the π -region,

worlds are R ($\neg R$) for the same reasons they're $S \& \pi$ rather than $\neg S \& \pi$ ($\neg S \& \pi$ rather than $S \& \pi$)

(ORTHOGONALITY) *outside* the π -region,

worlds are R ($\neg R$) for the same reasons as worlds are R ($\neg R$) within.

Try it on example (3). Sticking to worlds where Harold is King, what distinguishes King-in-counting-house worlds from the others? Well, in those worlds, *Harold is in the counting house*. Does the proposition that Harold is in the counting house hold on the same basis when Harold is not King as when he is? Yes, Harold's whereabouts decide the truth-value quite independently of whether Harold is King. So the real content of *The King is in the counting house*, pivoting on the assumption that Harold is King, is *Harold is in the counting house*.

(P) S 's real content, relative to π , is the most widely defined R agreeing with S on π and orthogonal to π .

The most widely defined R agreeing with S on π and orthogonal to π is known on independent grounds to be the remainder when π is subtracted from S . So S 's real content is $S - \pi$. How in practice do we find it?

By completing enthymemes:

	Q: All firefighters are goalkeepers and vice versa. R: ?????????? S: No firefighters are horticulturalists.	Q: $\forall x(Fx \equiv Gx)$ R: ?????????? S: $\forall x(Fx \supset \neg Hx)$
✓	No goalkeepers are horticulturalists. YES!	$\forall x(Gx \supset \neg Hx)$ YES!
✗a	No firefighters are beekeepers.	$\forall x(Fx \supset \neg Bx)$
✗b	No firefighters are horticulturalists or beekeepers.	$\forall x(Fx \supset (\neg Hx \& \neg Bx))$
✗c	All f-fighters are g-keepers and no g-keepers are h-ists.	$\forall x(Fx \supset Gx) \& \forall x(Gx \supset \neg Hx)$
✗d	If all and only f-fighters are g-keepers, no f-fighters are h-ists.	$\forall x(Fx \equiv Gx) \supset \forall x(Fx \supset \neg Hx)$
✗e	No firefighting goalkeepers are horticulturalists.	$\forall x((Fx \& Gx) \supset \neg Hx)$

a violates Sufficiency Given Q , R should suffice for S .

b violates Necessity Given Q , R should be necessary for S .

c violates Non-redundancy Falsmakers for R shouldn't force Q too to be false.

d violates Integrity R 's truthmakers in $\neg Q$ -worlds should have been truthmakers in Q -worlds.

e violates Moreover R 's truthmakers in Q -worlds should be those worlds' reasons for being moreover S .

Putting π for Q , {Sufficiency, Necessity, Moreover} = AGREEMENT and {Non-Redundancy, Integrity} = ORTHOGONALITY. *These are the conditions (P) uses to define S's real content relative to π . So,*

(P') S 's real content, relative to π , is the premise one must add to π to ensure that S is true.

(M') S 's real content, relative to γ , is how the props have to be to ensure that S is fictional.

Stanley: nothing prevents "the hermeneutic fictionalist from simply declaring, when faced with an ontologically loaded discourse, that its users... employ principles of generation that link the discourse up with ontologically innocent truth-conditions..." (HF, 43) Presuppositions are harder to "declare."

Negation test: Denying *The # of planets is 8* is not asserting *There is no such entity or it is not 8*.

New information test: **There are exactly eight planets, indeed the number of planets is 8*,

"Competent users of theoretical discourse will certainly deny that they are pretending when they discuss arithmetic" (HF, 46). Will they deny they are presupposing?

Piggybacking is not just a scenic alternative to pivoting; it's more powerful. But contents accessible via expansive games—ones where fictional truth-conditions "relax" literal truth-conditions—can it seems also be accessed by pivoting on corresponding presuppositions. The philosophically controversial games—the ones invoked by fictionalists about numbers, properties, mereological sums, etc.—are (it seems) expansive. Controversial fictionalisms can, so presumably should, be replayed in the key of presupposition.





Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4