Reference:
Review Excerpts 'My purpose in this article is to assess the role of mutual knowledge
and beliefs in a psychological theory of conversation inference. I will
attempt to support what I call the mutual knowledge hypothesis, which
assumes that listeners use the knowledge and beliefs they share with
speakers in the process of interpreting utterances in conversation'
(562).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | conversation |
hypothesis |
inference |
knowledge |
purpose |
role |
theory |
'This original definition of mutual knowledge raises a serious
paradox. The infinite series of beliefs statements is seen as necessary,
although it is highly unlikely that listeners can compute an infinite series
of these propositions in a finite period of time' (565).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | definition |
knowledge |
paradox |
Gibbs introduces the following example: Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | 'The issue of what kinds of experience constitute "knowing" or
"assuming" as opposed to merely being "manifest" is a delicate one. Yet
making a distinction between something being "known" and other things
being "manifest" to someone might artificially create a difference where
none exists' (568).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | difference |
distinction |
'My main contention, then, is that Sperber and Wilson are
"sneaking" mutual knowledge in the backdoor of their theory of
conversational inference by appealing to the idea of mutual cognitive
environments which can be manifest but not known. At a psychological
level, it appears that Sperber and Wilson have adopted a framework for
describing verbal communication which crucially depends on the very
concept that they wish to abandon' (569).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | communication |
concept |
contention |
framework |
idea |
inference |
knowledge |
level |
theory |
verbal |
'The first task facing a listener in understanding an utterance,
according to Sperber and Wilson's relevance hypothesis is to identify its
propositional form.... They assume that the initial parse of a sentence
begins in some sort of input module ... which results in its literal,
context-free, representation' (569-70).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | form | hypothesis |
listener |
literal |
relevance |
representation |
sentence |
understanding |
utterance |
Gibbs claims that 'These results [of Ortony et al. (1978) on
comprehension of metaphors] strongly demonstrate that context plays a
crucial role in the interpretation of metaphoric language. With sufficient
linguistic and social context, people understand the nonliteral
interpretations of metaphoric utterances directly without first analyzing
their putative literal meanings' (571-2).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | comprehension |
context |
interpretation |
language |
literal |
role |
'Even if one assumes that mutual knowledge is not necessary for
comprehension, there is much psychological evidence which is not in
accord with many of the basic assumptions underlying the relevance
hypothesis. The weight of this evidence suggests that it may be
premature to accept the relevance hypothesis as a reasonable model of
the psychological processes used in working out conversational
inferences' (574-5).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | comprehension |
evidence |
hypothesis |
knowledge |
relevance |
'Clark and Marshall (1981)... have attempted to show that mutual
knowledge can be established in practice by arguing that the apparent
paradox of mutual knowledge is base on two incorrect assumptions. The
first is the assumption that mutual beliefs must be represented in a
mental model as an infinite series of belief statements'. What they
propose is that 'if A and B make certain assumptions about each other's
rationality, they can use certain states of affairs as a basis for inferring
the infinity of conditions all at once' (575).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | assumption |
basis |
infinity |
knowledge |
paradox |
'Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the mutual
knowledge hypothesis and the relevance hypothesis concerns the
constraints each places on the kinds of inference generated during
utterance interpretation. Consider the following exchange: Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | difference |
hypothesis |
inference |
interpretation |
knowledge |
relevance |
utterance |
'Although Sperber and Wilson (1986) comment that it is easy
enough to modify [their] definition [of communication] ... and make
intentionality a defining feature of communication, it is not at all clear how
this modification can be made without acknowledging the specific role
mutual knowledge has on the determination of ... inferences'
(581).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | communication |
definition |
determination |
intentionality |
knowledge |
role |
'When listeners are addressed by someone, they usually assume
the speaker has done his/her best to enable them to understand him/her'
(582).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | speaker |
'People will design their questions in light of the mutual knowledge
which exists between themselves and their listeners' (584).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | knowledge |
'My arguments is favor of the mutual knowledge hypothesis and
against the relevance hypothesis are grounded in five interrelated
observations. First, I have suggested the Sperber and Wilson's proposal
that mutual cognitive environments constitute the true context for
comprehension is not sufficiently clear and distinguishable from the
concept of mutual knowledge. As such, the relevance hypothesis seems
to make use of the very idea that it attempts to replace. Second, mutual
knowledge is possible to determine in a finite period of time via Clark
and Marshall's (1981) mutual knowledge induction scheme without
resorting to an infinite set of beliefs statements usually viewed as a
consequence of establishing mutual knowledge. Third, it appears that
mutual knowledge is indeed a necessary prerequisite for the
comprehension of many kinds of utterances in conversation. This is
particularly true if listeners are to distinguish between inferences that are
ostensively intended or "authorized" by speakers from inferences that are
"unauthorized". Conversations are only cooperative to the extent to which
speakers specifically intend and listeners specifically recognize
"m-intended" messages. Part of my thesis here is that how listeners are
able to distinguish "authorized" versus "unauthorized" inferences must be
part of a cognitive theory of conversational inferences. Fourth, parts of
the processing model underlying the relevance hypothesis are not
supported by contemporary psycholinguistic research. Specifically, there
is little empirical evidence in favor of the idea that listeners must first
decode an utterance into some propositional representation before
choosing a context in which that proposition is viewed as most relevant.
Finally, there is some recent psycholinguistic evidence demonstrating
that speakers formulate their utterances precisely to satisfy the amount
of knowledge they share with their listeners. This shared knowledge is
also directly utilized by listeners when interpreting utterances in everyday
discourse. These findings appear most congruent with the predictions of
the mutual knowledge hypothesis' (585).
Domains: Under construction |
Key Terms: | comprehension |
concept |
consequence |
context |
conversation |
discourse |
empirical |
evidence |
hypothesis |
idea |
knowledge |
proposition |
relevance |
representation |
research |
theory |
thesis |
utterance |
Last Modified:
July-12-96 9:20:24
Reply to randy_radney@sil.org
'He: Can Susan
drive a Buick?
She: She can drive any car.' (566).
'He: Are
you going to the party tonight?
'She: I hear Jack's coming.'
(579).
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