Beware of BRT Oversell (Revised)

Bus Rapid Transit

A www.publictransit.us Editorial

Michael D. Setty • Leroy W. Demery, Jr.
Updated 1/22/07

“Bus Rapid Transit” (BRT) has been promoted as an "all-purpose" alternative to light rail transit (LRT). But, in our view, BRT is now at the brink of oversell. If this continues much longer, the issue will no longer be whether (and where) BRT can match the performance and cost parameters of LRT, but rather damage control. As a very promising concept, BRT could easily lose crucial credibility with transit stakeholders and decision makers, particularly where real world performance doesn’t live up to the hype. Detroit provides an example of "BRT oversell" in the making, relevant to Kansas City and other large metro areas. "SpeedLink" outlines an 11-corridor BRT network. Many of these corridors probably do not have sufficient demand to justify the higher capital costs of LRT. However, building BRT in the highest-density corridor first, Woodward Avenue–establishing modal equivalence by fiat–may have significant negative consequences. If operating costs prove higher and actual capacity lower than anticipated, as appears likely, there could be a loss of BRT credibility with stakeholders and decision makers. This would compromise prospects for successful BRT implementation in other Detroit area corridors and perhaps in other regions. Many U.S. cities have sufficient population, downtown employment, and an existing base of transit patronage strong enough to justify improved transit capacity and service quality through significant capital investment. Nationwide, there probably are several dozen urban corridors currently without LRT or regional rail on existing tracks that may justify new investment. There may also be several hundred more with sufficient patronage potential to justify BRT. As an example, Eugene, OR, has relatively high transit patronage for a U.S. city in its size range. But Eugene also stands out as a city where the conditions justifying LRT, or even a low-cost line like the Portland Streetcar, do not exist. There are few natural barriers in Eugene. Population and downtown employment levels are clearly not sufficient to justify rail transit today. The Lane Transit District has recognized this, and developed a BRT line that might be a prototype for smaller cities and for corridors in larger cities where patronage potential does not justify LRT. Eugene’s "EmX Green Line," connecting Eugene and Springfield, was opened on 14 January 2007
http://www.ltd.org/search/showresult.html?versionthread=6eec24bb231297a66d73fb145404cef2 . In contrast, low-cost LRT and/or regional rail on existing tracks are credible options for Madison, Wisconsin, which is only somewhat larger than Eugene-Springfield. But downtown Madison has roughly three to four times more jobs than downtown Eugene, and the huge University of Wisconsin campus is nearby (the University of Oregon campus in Eugene is only one-third the size of UW). Downtown Madison is also built on a narrow isthmus, contributing to congestion. Thus, average weekday rail patronage and peak-period volumes would probably be considerably higher than in Eugene. Some form of cost-effective (e.g., non-"gold plated") rail transit may be viable today in Madison; it will not be so for years to come in Eugene.
http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/streetcar/
The case for LRT or regional rail on existing tracks in larger, but more decentralized cities such as Grand Rapids, Lansing, or Toledo is less clear; BRT may yet be the best choice. BRT oversell is less an issue for Eugene than in larger cities, such as Detroit and Kansas City. Transit stakeholders and decision makers should be wary of claims regarding the efficacy of BRT in high-demand corridors. "Think rail, use buses" makes a catchy slogan. The problem: Buses may cost significantly more to operate, provide significantly less capacity and lower service quality than rail. Equivalence between modes cannot be accomplished by fiat. In the U.S., there is always much commentary on which mode–rail or bus-–is more attractive to passengers. Unfortunately most of this is just pontification, uninformed by empirical “real world” data. In contrast, Demery has collected as much data on peak-hour, peak-direction passenger volumes carried by U.S. and Canadian busway, HOV, and rail operations as could be found over the last decade. From this data, a uniform statistic has been calculated: passengers per meter of vehicle length ("pass/m"). For a detailed compilation, see "Peak Period Service Supply vs. Observed Passenger Utilization" available here. For reasons ultimately stemming from consumer choice, peak-hour crowding aboard rail vehicles stabilizes at about 4.0 pass/m across a wide range of travel corridors and levels of demand. The busway/HOV figure is lower: three pass/m. In fact, the observed busway/HOV maximum (3.7 pass/m) is lower than the rail median (4.1 pass/m). Peak vehicle occupancies greater than 4.0 pass/m seldom occur outside the four most crowded and congested urban centers: Boston, Montreal, New York, and Toronto (5.0 pass/m has been recorded in Portland). It is now clear that U.S. and Canadian consumers will not accept crowding at levels implied by the "capacity" figures used in many transit studies during the 1970’s and 1980’s. In Portland, prior to construction, LRT planners estimated vehicle "capacity" at 166 passengers (6.1 pass/m; 90-foot vehicles), based on 76 seated passengers and 4 standees per square meter of vehicle area. But Tri-Met has found that Portland LRT passengers will accept 135 passengers per vehicle (4.9 pass/m)–and no more that during peak hours that except during special events. Some BRT promoters have claimed that in the U.S., up to 180 riders could be carried on double-articulated, 80-foot long (24.4 meter) articulated BRT vehicles. But empirical data suggests no more than 85-90 persons (3.7 pass/m X 24.4 m) on such a bus. Ultimately, what transit professionals believe is unimportant. What "they" (consumers) do is what counts. BRT should be developed where it makes sense; build on a record of success; don't oversell the concept. After all, if something sounds too good to be true, then it probably is. Biographical Sketches Michael D. Setty, owner and Principal of Publictransit.us (formerly Carquinez Associates), is a transportation consultant with nearly 30 years of experience in all aspects of public transit planning, finance, administration, and operations. He began his career in 1978 with a rural transit agency east of Sacramento. Setty worked at the Metropolitan Transportation Commission 1981-1984, Oakland, CA., and has worked as an independent consultant specializing in ferry and bus systems since 1985. Leroy W. Demery, Jr., Senior Associate, Publictransit.us, is a transport research specialist, analyst and author. His published articles deal with various aspects of public transit planning, operation, analysis and finance (including "Supply-Side Analysis and Verification of Ridership Forecasts for Mass Transit Capital Projects," Journal of the American Planning Association 60, 3: 355-371, 1994). He is the lead author of a series of books on Japanese urban transport systems, Electric Railways of Japan (Light Rail Transit Association, London, 1983, 1985, 1997). He has also taught mathematics in several public high schools.

Monday, January 22, 2007

Beware of BRT Oversell (Revised)