I found this a fascinating approach to describing the evolution of armed conflict.  Keegan dispenses with the traditional military historiography and takes on new dimensions:

 

“What I mean to attempt here is something altogether smaller, though still, I think, important: to tackle again the concept of the ‘battle piece’ and to suggest ways in which it might be wrenched out of the stereotype into which it has been set for so long by custom and unreflective imitation.  I do not intend to write about generals or generalship, except to discuss how a commander’s physical presence on the field may have influenced his subordinates’ will to combat.  I do not intend to say anything of logistics or strategy and very little of tactics in the formal sense.  And I do not intend to offer two-sided picture of events, since what happened to one side in any battle I describe will be enough to convey the features I think are salient.  On the other hand, I do intend to discuss wounds and their treatment, the mechanics of being taken prisoner, the nature of leadership at the most junior level, the role of compulsion in getting men to stand their ground, the incidence of accidents as a cause of death in war and, above all, the dimensinos of the danger which different varieties of weapons offer to the soldier on the battlefield.  Crudely, but I think meaningfully, one may distinguish three sorts of battlefield weapons: the hand weapon -- sword or lance; the single-missile weapon - musket or rifle; the multi-missile weapon -- machine gun or projector of toxic-gas particles.  I have chose three battles to describe in detail -- Agincourt, Waterloo, the Somme -- my basis of choice being availability of evidence, and my purpose to demonstrate, as exactly as possible, what the warfare, respectively, of hand, single-missile and multiple-missile weapons was (and is) like, and to suggest how and why the men who have had (and do have) to face these weapons control their fears, staunch their wounds, go to their deaths.  It is a personal attempt to catch a glimpse of the face of battle.”  

 

Keegan describes as above the nature of three battles, roughly in geographic proximity, over five hundred years:  Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815), and The Somme (1916). In Agincourt, he takes up sequentially the engagements of archers versus infantry and cavalry, cavalry versus infantry, infantry versus infantry, and the killing of prisoners.  In Waterloo, he takes up the pair-wise engagements now including artillery.  In the Somme, again the pair-wise engagements now including machine guns.  These are all instructive in natural (animal and human) behavior, particularly as Keegan observes the critical distance separating retreat response with attack response.  He shows, particularly at Waterloo, how the distance between pairs changed the altercation.  Another interesting point is the order of confrontation, such as Napolean’s column approaching Wellington’s line -- a rout for the Brits.  Keegan takes us to the Somme because the line facing line order, with a long critical distance separating forces, made the engagement seem faceless.    

 

Despite this well-received book, Keegan’s later works seemed to have been panned, painting him something of an academic crank.  Perhaps this is because he is in fact a member of the academy, yet he goes to unusual lengths to explain that his view may indeed be skewed by his lack of experience in warfare.  Keegan also recently has been in the papers and blogs stating he viewed the recent Israeli-Hezbollah war as a mere prelude for another such conflict to occur soon.  

 

John Keegan