This morning I attended the policy discussion “What to do about Darfur” at the Holocaust Museum.  The ‘discussion’ between Alex de Waal and John Prendergast lasted over 2 hours and was quite informative - especially as regards the perceived obstacles to peace in Darfur.  

It was interesting to hear their agreement on this issue, since it is an idea batted around by activists, members of Congress and others.  

Prendergast agreed with de Waal that a militarily-enforced no fly zone would only make matters worse.  He recounted a discussion with Rwandan President Paul Kagame who said that a no fly zone would be “highly irresponsible,” emphasis on the highly.  Without substantial forces in place to reenforce any punishment of no fly zone violators the situation could spiral out of control.  

The basic question here was: what’s missing from the peace agreement that kept many of the rebel groups from signing?  What should happen once a good peace agreement is signed?  

I had an opportunity to sit in on meetings with JEM and SLM (non-Minawi branch) representatives last year shortly after they declined to sign the DPA.  Their concerns were two-fold: compensation and better representation in the government.  They felt that the peace agreement didn’t adequately provide either of these; not enough money to help people get home, and not enough say in national politics once they did.  

However, as de Waal emphasized, the articulation of these needs should come from the Darfurian people (not US activists, not even the rebel leaders, the people).  I hope that the negotiators of future peace agreement iterations make a concerted effort to ensure that the voices of the people of Darfur are heard loudly and clearly.  

de Waal noted that “we have a multilateral moment emerging” for collaboration to ensure peace in Darfur.  Prendergast elaborated that the missing ingredient in international diplomacy is leverage, and that France, China and the US have the most of that.  Furthermore, “China and France have the biggest stake in stability in South Sudan”.  At this moment we have “a golden opportunity” because France and China, previously obstacles to resolution of the conflict, are opening up.  France’s new president is not only willing to work with the US, but has expressed concern for Darfur.  China is now more receptive to international calls for change because of the upcoming Olympics.  Therefore, Prendergast suggested, these three countries need to “form an axis for peace” in Darfur.  

There was actually only one significant disagreement in this discussion that Prendergast compared with the “Rumble in the Jungle” and the Red Sox/Yankees rivalry.  

The disagreement focused on whether or not a credible threat of military force should be on the table as a “stick” with which to threaten the Sudanese government.  Prendergast says yes, de Waal says no.  Here’s why:

Prendergast: He believes it’s an important part of the international community’s leverage with Sudan.  Any military plans, though, have to have civilian protection as their sole objective and would only be put in place if the GOS cut off all humanitarian aid.  He asked, “what in the hell is this international responsibility to protect” if we can’t have some military plans to protect Darfur?  

The disagreement was a bit strange, since a) the Presidential election is a long way off, b) it was George W Bush not Clinton who took out Saddam Hussein and c) at this point it seems quite unlikely that the US will use military force.  However, if de Waal is right, and people talking about this makes the GOS less likely to negotiate, then they should stop.  But, if Prendergast is right and that threat will make them more likely to negotiate, then such isolated calls for military action can only help.  

What left me a little confused is if two Sudan experts can’t agree on what motivates the GOS, how will the activist community ever know what to push for?  Prendergast began the discussion by saying that any disagreements they had shouldn’t be interpreted as a sign of a huge schism in the movement, that it’s a sign of the movement’s diversity and the number of important aspects to any solution to Darfur.  Hopefully that’s the case on this issue.