Africa, War and International Law
There are two new, interesting articles out about Africa, military intervention and the evolving international legal norm known as the “Responsibility to Protect”.
The first article is from Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times, the first from his most recent trip to Africa with the “win a trip with Nick Kristof” contest. As usual, Kristof personalizes the issue, telling the story of a mother who has lost many of her children to malnutrition and disease.
... Sure, aid has a role to play, but it’s pointless to build clinics when rebel groups are running around burning towns and shooting doctors.
One essential kind of help that the West can provide — but one that is rarely talked about — is Western military assistance in squashing rebellions, genocides and civil wars, or in protecting good governments from insurrections. The average civil war costs $64 billion, yet could often be suppressed in its early stages for very modest sums. The British military intervention in Sierra Leone easily ended a savage war and was enthusiastically welcomed by local people — and, as a financial investment, achieved benefits worth 30 times the cost.
Josh Ruxin, a Columbia University public health expert living in Rwanda, notes that a modest Western force could have stopped the genocide in 1994 — or, afterward, rooted out Hutu extremists who fled to Congo and dragged that country into a civil war that has cost millions of lives.
“Had an international force come in and rounded them up, that would have been the biggest life-saving measure in modern history,” he said.
So it’s time for the G-8 countries to conceive of foreign aid more broadly — not just to build hospitals and schools, but also to work with the African Union to provide security in areas that have been ravaged by rebellion and war. A starting point would be a serious effort to confront genocide in Darfur — and at least an international force to prop up Chad and Central African Republic, rather than allow Africa to tumble into its second world war.
Julian Ku at Opinio Juris notes about Kristof’s article:
I think Kristof makes a lot of sense when he talks about Darfur. The importance of ending military conflict, whether through peace agreement (as the BBC details here) or via an outside intervention, is often underestimated by campaigners for Darfur.
On the other hand, Kristof is beginning to sound like George Bush, or at least Tony Blair. Doesn't he realize he is talking about violating international law? And if his ideas are followed, expect Mr. Liberal Do-Gooder to be the target of international criminal prosecutions...
I agree with Ku’s assertion that Kristof’s proposal would be a violation of international law, as it currently stands. I disagree, however, that “campaigners for Darfur” underestimate “the importance of ending military conflict” - in my experience Darfur activists are much better informed than most people give them credit for.
The second article is from Alex de Waal, in the Harvard International Review. It’s a lot longer than Kristof’s, but well worth the read.
de Waal begins with an important assertion about the legal status of the Responsibility to Protect:
Most contemporary debates treat military humanitarian intervention and its younger sibling, the responsibility to protect (R2P), as matters of law. But perhaps because of the implication that “humanitarian” actions are above criticism, and because the reality of war is clouded by the euphemism “intervention,” there has been too little comparative and historical analysis of the topic. Still less have recent humanitarian interventions been studied as instances of aggressive war – albeit arguably “just war.” This essay explores the contemporary history of humanitarian intervention, arguing that Harcourt’s skepticism is as warranted today as it was when he discouraged the British Parliament from voting to intervene in the American Civil War.
de Waal then chronicles various international humanitarian interventions, starting with the creation of an Iraqi Kurdistan safe haven, Somalia, Operation Turquoise, the Balkans, and West Africa. He concludes with the case of Darfur:
Darfur has been seen as the test case for the R2P. Indisputably, the international community has failed to provide protection for Darfur’s civilians. The small over-stretched and under-mandated African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission cannot contain the violence. Most activists and many diplomats draw the inference that the problem is lack of international political will. If greater pressure were piled on Khartoum (and if China were persuaded or bullied into line), they assume, then the Sudanese government would permit the AU mission to be replaced by a much tougher UN force authorized to take robust action, which would actually halt the killing. Though this analysis is attractive, it does not hold up.
Both supporters and critics of a UN force in Sudan argue on the false premise that UN troops will have the mandate and capability to protect millions of civilians at risk by using force. Despite the tough language of UN Security Council resolution 1706 of August 31, 2006, that is not true. The 20,000 troops envisioned would be enough only to police the ceasefire agreement drawn up by the African Union at the Darfur peace talks and to shoot their way out of trouble if things went wrong. Policing Darfur – or more ambitiously, disarming the Janjaweed militia – would require a far bigger and tougher force. Doubtless, the UN could overcome some of the logistical and financial problems the AU has faced, but a handover to the UN would be only an incremental advance. ...
However attractive it might be from a distance, actually providing physical protection for Darfurians with international troops is not feasible. And unfortunately, the clamor for UN troops has consumed most of the diplomatic energies of the United States and its allies over the last 18 months, diverting efforts from achieving a peace agreement that was within grasp a year ago but has now slipped away. And as a direct result, the existing AU troops have been left without funds, and sometimes without food or fuel, and above all without any effort to upgrade their numbers and capability.
Meanwhile, the focus on numbers, armor, and mandate obscured the fundamental question of the concept of operations. What are the troops there to do? Effective peace support is nine parts political work and community relations to one part force or the threat of force, but the Darfur debate has focused on force alone and not the politics of stability. Making Darfur the test case for the R2P has not helped the search for political solutions in Darfur. It unrealistically raised the hopes of the rebels and intensified the fears of the government. This illustrates the blind alley down which the concept of humanitarian intervention has led many idealistic, principled, and concerned people.
There is no such thing as humanitarian military intervention distinct from war or counterinsurgency. Intervention and occupation should not be confused with classic peacekeeping, which is difficult enough even with a ceasefire agreement and the consent of the parties. If we want an intervention to overthrow a tyranny, protect citizens from their own government, or deliver humanitarian aid during an ongoing conflict, we should be honest with ourselves – we are arguing for a just war. And if we wish to make this case, let us be clear that the war is political (and must be very smartly political to succeed); that military logic will dictate what happens (including probable escalation and various unpredictable factors); and that it will entail bloodshed including the killing of innocent people.
Let us be very wary of developing any doctrine for humanitarian intervention. Any principle of intervention can readily be abused – as by the French in central Africa – or become a charter for imperial occupation. There may be cases in which imperial rule is the lesser of two evils, perhaps to end genocide (a current preoccupation) or to end slavery (a late 19th century one), but philanthropic imperialism is imperial nonetheless. As Harcourt noted, ethics can sometimes override law, and invasion, like revolution, can sometimes bring about a better state of affairs. But chasing the chimera of humanitarian intervention distracts us and impedes the search for real solutions to crises such as Darfur.
There must be some kind of middle ground between these two viewpoints. I can’t help but agree with Gareth Evans, head of the International Crisis Group, who said:
state sovereignty is not a license to kill – ...there is something fundamentally and intolerably wrong about states murdering or forcibly displacing large numbers of their own citizens, or standing by when others do so.
The international community has to enforce that - at least diplomatically, if not militarily.
Thursday, June 14, 2007
