OUR SINCERE THANKS TO THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS FOR THEIR VALUABLE AND STIMULATING PRESENTATIONS AND TO THE MEMBERS OF THE AUDIENCE WHO HEARD THE PAPERS AND JOINED INTO THE DISCUSSIONS.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PRESENCE AND PARTICIPATION WHICH MADE THIS CONFERENCE THE GREAT SUCCESS THAT IT WAS.

DR RICHARD TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

DR OWEN GOLDIN, PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

DR FRANCO TRIVIGNO, PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY

“Thought and Action in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition”

Fourth Annual Marquette Summer Seminar in

Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

Presented by the Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

and the Aquinas and the Arabs Project

with the support of the

Helen Way Klingler College of Arts and Sciences at Marquette

Marquette University

Department of Philosophy

Milwaukee, Wisconsin,

June 16-18, 2009

This Conference is intended to provide a formal occasion and central location for philosophers and scholars of the Midwest region (and elsewhere) to present and discuss their current work on Aristotle’ and his Interpreters in ancient and medieval philosophy.

For the 2009 conference a record number of applications (41) were received for the 15 slots for presentations.  Thematic unity played a strong role in the final selection procedure, as did other considerations.  We regret that we had to decline so many very fine proposals.

ATTENDING ONLY: Send Registration check with name, address, academic affiliation.

CONFERENCE REGISTRATION FOR ALL PRESENTERS AND ATTENDEES

(fees cover breakfasts, refreshments, dinner one night)

Advance Registration ($40 by check) Deadline: June 8.

NOTE => After June 8 Registration only at the door: $50 cash.

CHECKS SHOULD BE MADE OUT TO: Marquette University

(Fees are waived for Marquette students, faculty and staff.)

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Registration Form.

NAME:

TITLE: 

ACADEMIC AFFILIATION:

ADDRESS:

EMAIL ADDRESS:

TELEPHONE:

CHECK NUMBER: 

(Registration fees are waived for members of the Marquette community.)

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Print the Registration Form above and send your check made out to “Marquette University” to:

Richard Taylor

Philosophy Department

Marquette University

P.O. Box 1880

Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881

Registered Attendees:

1. 1.Dr. Trenton R. Ferro, Shorewood, Illinois (pd.)
   

2. 2.Ms Jessica Corder, Milwaukee, WI (MU undergrad, fee waived)
   

3. 3.Ms Mara Brandli, Fon Du Lac, WI (MU undergrad, fee waived)
   

4. 4.Prof. David Chan, UW-Stevens Point, WI (pd.)
   

5. 5.Prof. Richard Ingardia. Saint John’s University, New York (pd.)
   

6. 6.Dr. Robert Greene. Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire (pd.)
   

7. 7.Br. Lawrence LaFlame (MU grad student, fee waived)
   

8. 8.Prof. Melissa Shew, visiting Assistant Professor, Marquette University (MU faculty, fee waived)
   

9. 9.Ms Traci Phillipson, (MU grad student, fee waived)
   

10. 10. Mr Alan Shear (MU grad student, fee waived)
    

11. 11. Prof. William Starr, Marquette University (MU faculty, fee waived)
    

12. 12. Miss Clare M Storck, The Catholic University of America (pd.)
    

13. 13. Prof. James South, Marquette University (MU faculty, fee waived)
    

14. 14. Prof. Susanne Foster, Marquette University (MU faculty, fee waived)
    

15. 15. Ms Dawn M. Freese, Marquette University (MU grad student, fee waived)
    

16. 16. Mr Michael Anderson, (MU grad student, fee waived)
    

17. 17. Prof. Curtis Carter, Marquette University (MU faculty, fee waived)
    

18. 18. Mr Adam Dawson, (MU grad student, fee waived)
    

19. 19. Mr Daniel Davidson, (MU alumnus & employee spouse, fee waived)
    

Conference Schedule

All sessions will be held in the Beaumier Conference Center in the lower level of Raynor Library. (See below for location link.)

TUESDAY JUNE 16:

Breakfast: 8:00 am. Coffee, tea, orange juice, bagels, muffins, et alia, at the Philosophy Department Commons, Coughlin Hall Room 139

Beaumier Conference Center

Presentations  

9-10:25: [1] Prof.  Rob Bolton, Rutgers University, “Cognition and the Reception of Form Without Matter in Aristotle”

10:35-12: [2] Ms. Karen Zwier, University of Pittsburgh,

“Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism: Putting Human Deliberation into Action”

12-1:30 pm Lunch: suggestions: AMU (Student Union), Subway, Jimmy John’s Subs, local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.

Presentations

1:30-2:55: [3] Prof. Joseph Novak, University of Waterloo,

“Minds in Aristotle: Mechanized or Personified?”

3:05-4:30: [4] Prof. William Jaworski, Fordham University

“Aristotle and the Philosophy of Mind: Hylomorphism, Physicalism, Emergentism, and Modern Biology”

4:40-6:05: [5] Dr. Anthony Crifasi, University of St Thomas, Houston, “Martha Nussbaum vs. the Commentary Tradition on Aristotelian Sense Perception”

7:00 pm Conference Dinner (included in conference fee) at the home of Prof. Taylor. Car pooling available.

WEDNESDAY JUNE 17: Beaumier Conference Center

Breakfast: 8:00 am. Coffee, tea, orange juice, bagels, muffins, et alia, at the Philosophy Department Commons, Coughlin Hall Room 139

Presentations

9-10:25: [6] Prof. Julie Ward, Loyola University of Chicago,

“Perceiving the Beacon as Enemy: Perception and Action in DA III 7”

10:35-12: [7] Prof. Thomas M. Olshewsky, University of Kentucky (emeritus),

“The Actualization of Action”

12-1:30 pm Lunch: suggestions: AMU (Student Union), Subway, Jimmy John’s Subs, local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.

Presentations

1:30-2:55: [8] Prof. Owen Goldin, Marquette University

“Aristotle on First Philosophy and the Imagination”

3:05-4:30: [9] Prof. Eugene Garver, Saint John’s University, MN

“Practical Knowledge and the Four Orientations to the Best”

4:40-6:05: [10] Prof.  Richard C. Taylor, Marquette University,

“Burnyeat and Averroes on Aristotle’s Intellect”

Dinner suggestions: The Milwaukee Ale House; The Rock Bottom Brewery; John Hawks Pub; and many more possibilities. Speak to the organizers for suggestions.

THURSDAY JUNE 18: Beaumier Conference Center

Breakfast: 8:00 am. Coffee, tea, orange juice, bagels, muffins, et alia, at the Philosophy Department Commons, Coughlin Hall Room 139

Presentations 

9-10:25: [11] Prof. Michael Bauer, Fordham University,

“How — if at all — Should We Speak about Natural Rights in the Aristotelian Tradition?”

10:35-12: [12] Ms. Kristen A. Inglis, Cornell University,

“Natural Slavery Psychology and Rational Wish in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics”

12-1:30 pm Lunch: suggestions: AMU (Student Union), Subway, Jimmy John’s Subs, local Pizza restaurant, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.

Presentations

1:30-2:55: [13] Prof. Franco Trivigno, Marquette University,

“Aristotle on Anger”

3:05-4:30: [14]  Johanna Luttrell, University of Oregon,

“On Desire in the Nicomachean Ethics”

4:40-6:05: [15]  Prof. James Wood, Boston University,

“The Interdependence of Theoretical and Moral Excellence”

6:05-6:15: Closing remarks

ca. 7:00 pm    Dinner at the Shahrazad Middle Eastern Restaurant. Car pooling available. Cost: ca. $18 per person plus drinks and tip (self-pay)

CONFERENCE LOCATION:

Conference sessions will take place in the Raynor Library (1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.) Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday June 16-18, 2009. For information on the Raynor Library and nearby parking see http://www.marquette.edu/contact/finder/raynor.shtml and the links there.

HOUSING:

On campus housing is available at a modest cost.  For information, click here.  To reserve a room contact the housing office directly:  Carrie Enea at 414-288-7204 or via email at carrie.enea@marquette.edu. Cut-off date for room reservations: May 17, 2009. Rooms requested after the cut-off date are subject to availability.

Rooms will be at Straz Tower, 915 W. Wisconsin Ave., a three block walk from the conference location.

PARKING:

Structure 1, located on 749 N. 16th Street, and Structure 2, located at 1240 W. Wells St ., have been designated the university’s visitor parking facilities. For information on the costs of parking ask at the check-in desk at Straz Tower, 915 W. Wisconsin Ave.

Daytime visitors’ parking 6 am - 5 pm is $5.00 per day at these structures.

Overnight parking ($6) can be arranged at the check-in desk at Straz Hall.

HOTELS:

Just a few blocks East from Marquette University is the Holiday Inn Milwaukee City Center, 611 West Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53203. Tel. 1-414-273-2950.

For further information on the hotel, see http://www.ichotelsgroup.com/h/d/hi/1/en/hd/mkecc?irs=null

A few blocks West from Marquette University is the very charming Ambassador Hotel: 2308 W Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53233. Tel.(414) 342-8400

For further information on the hotel, see www.ambassadormilwaukee.com

(Mention that you are attending a Marquette conference may get you a discount. Be sure to ask.)

DIRECTIONS AND MAPS:

For directions to the Marquette Campus, see http://www.marquette.edu/contact/directions/

For a map of the Marquette University campus, see http://www.marquette.edu/contact/CampusMap.pdf

For a map of downtown Milwaukee, see

http://www.wisconline.com/counties/milwaukee/map-downtown.html

TRAVELING TO MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY (& DOWNTOWN MILWAUKEE) FROM

MILWAUKEE’S MITCHELL AIRPORT:

For a shuttle, see http://www.mitchellairport.com/getting.html

Downtown Milwaukee: info from http://kiwinc.itgo.com/mwc/mitchell.html

    * Expect a taxi to cost around $30 or a bit more due to fuel costs.

    * Most convenient: Airport Connection shared ride van serves a frequent loop of most downtown hotels. http://mkelimo.com/ ($12-15)

    * Cheapest: MCTS bus route 80 serves 6th St. downtown, next to the Midwest Airlines Center and nearby hotels. Travel time is 25 minutes, often only a few minutes longer than taxi or van.

http://www.ridemcts.com/routes_and_schedules/schedule.asp?route=80

Straz Tower is at 9th and Wisconsin.

The Conference Center is in the lower level of Raynor Library at 1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.

Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy link:

http://web.mac.com/mistertea/Midwest_Seminar/Welcome.html

Aquinas and the Arabs Project link:

http://web.mac.com/mistertea/iWeb/Aquinas%20&%20the%20Arabs/Aquinas%20&%20the%20Arabs.html

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT link:

http://www.marquette.edu/phil/

Presentation Abstracts

Below are the accepted initial proposals in alphabetical order by author

[11] Michael Bauer, Fordham University,

“How — if at all — Should We Speak about Natural Rights in the Aristotelian Tradition?”

Abstract: One of the great contemporary representatives of the Aristotelian tradition in ethics and politics – Alasdair MacIntyre – holds that the notion of “natural rights” or “human rights” is entirely alien to the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas (see After Virtue, pp. 64-67). By contrast, many other thinkers working within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition have held that belief in human nature and human dignity entails belief in the existence of “natural rights” or “human rights.” In this paper, I argue that the two opposing sides in this debate about “natural rights” in the Aristotelian tradition are largely talking past one another, since neither side has given sufficient consideration to the very meaning and conditions of “right.” More specifically, I argue that the notion of rights in the Aristotelian tradition – including the notion of “natural rights” or “human rights” – has no defensible meaning apart from the notion of justice; and in turn, that the notion of justice has no defensible meaning apart from the notion of a community of two or more members whose acts or works can be regarded as adjusted or commensurated to one another in some relevant respect (i.e., whose acts or works can be regarded as instantiating a kind of equality in some relevant respect and in accordance with some common measure). As Aquinas observes (Summa Theol., II-II, Q. 57, aa. 1-3), the proper object of justice is jus, or right, which is a kind of ordering or adjustment according to which the acts and/or works of separate agents are made commensurate or equal with respect to one another.

One implication of the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of “right” that I wish to defend is that “rights” are relational. To “possess a right,” on the account I wish to defend, is not to possess a power or liberty or natural property (something on par with the property of having earlobes or kneecaps) that one would possess apart from any relation to others. Rather, to “possess a right” is to occupy a place within an order of justice. But while rights are relational, it does not follow that “respect for rights” is reducible to respect for values or goods that are “merely relative” or “merely convention-based.” For both Aristotle and Aquinas, it is possible to regard human acts and works as commensurable to one another, only because such acts and works are expressions of a common human nature (and this human nature, in itself, entails a species-specific capacity for rationality and worthiness of respect). If the proper commensuration between human individuals and their acts is observed, then (natural or positive) rights are respected; if the proper commensuration is not observed, then (natural or positive) rights are violated. But note: to say that a certain kind of goodness or worthiness exists wherever human nature exists, is not to say that “natural rights” or “human rights” exist wherever some human being exists. A crucial element in this account of “natural rights” might be illustrated through an analogy drawn from the physical sciences: the notion of “natural rights” stands to the notion of “human nature” as the notion of “weight” stands to the notion of “mass.” According to the modern scientific understanding, a body does not have weight if there is no other body present to exert the gravitational force of attraction upon it; but while a body has weight only insofar as it stands in relation to some other body, a body is capable of having such weight only because it has mass as an intrinsic property of itself, and would continue to have mass (as well as other intrinsic properties belonging to it on account of its mass) even if it did not stand in relation to any other body. By the same token, a human being does not possess “natural rights” if his or her acts or works cannot be regarded as adjustable or commensurable to the acts or works of other human beings; but while a human being has “natural rights” only insofar as he or she stands in some relevant relation to one or more other human beings, a human being is capable of having such rights only because he or she has a human nature and would continue to have this human nature (as well as other intrinsic properties belonging to him or her on account of this nature) even if he or she had no relation at all to other human beings.

[1] Rob Bolton, Rutgers University, “Cognition and the Reception of Form Without Matter in Aristotle”

[5]  Anthony Crifasi, University of St. Thomas, Houston,

“Martha Nussbaum vs. the Commentary Tradition on Aristotelian Sense Perception”

Abstract: In their 1992 essay, “Changing Aristotle’s Mind,” Martha Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam defended a contemporary “functionalist” reading of Aristotle’s analysis of sensation. According to this reading, Aristotelian sense perception inherently involves active physiological changes in sense organs themselves. Their essay was a reply to Myles Burnyeat, who had argued that Aristotelian sense perception does not inherently require any physical changes in sense organs, but only that they be made of certain kinds of matter that can passively receive sensory qualities from objects. In response, Nussbaum and Putnam argued that Aristotle’s definition of the soul in terms of “functional organization” only requires that sense organs be organized in a certain way, not that they be made of a particular kind of matter, since different kinds of matter can be organized in the same way.

The textual merits of each of these two readings have been debated at length in philosophical literature over the past three decades. There is one dimension of this dispute, however, that has not been as fully explored. As historical support for his reading, Burnyeat cites a long line of Aristotelian commentators that includes John Philoponus and Thomas Aquinas. In response, Nussbaum and Putnam acknowledge the “long history” of this rival interpretation, but dismiss it as a misreading due to Christian bias and “theodicy,” citing especially Thomas Aquinas’ reading of Aristotle in terms of intentionality. Nussbaum points out that Aquinas did not read Greek, and contends that William of Moerbeke’s knowledge of Greek was “not all it might be”.

This dispute between Burnyeat and Nussbaum therefore represents far more than a mere textual disagreement between those individuals. The twentieth century saw an explosion of Aristotelian scholarship in all areas, much of which was devoted to arguing that the previous nineteen centuries had misread Aristotle. Nussbaum herself played a large role in that movement over the past three decades, proposing novel readings of Aristotle’s metaphysics, biology, psychology, and ethics. Consequently, this dispute involves not only an academic issue about Aristotelian texts, but also a clash of traditions on how to interpret the history of philosophy. There is therefore much at stake if readings like Burnyeat’s are correct, as evidenced by the fact that Nussbaum and Putnam felt compelled to “take up arms together” in response.

I will argue that a survey of the Aristotelian commentary tradition cited by Burnyeat reveals several crucial weaknesses in Nussbaum’s criticism of Aquinas’ reading of Aristotelian sense perception. First, the significance she places on Aquinas’ inability to read Greek may be evaluated by comparing his interpretation to that of John Philoponus, who was completely fluent in Greek. I will argue that this comparison reveals a tight parallel between the two. Secondly, her charge of Christian bias may be tested by comparing the commentaries of both Aquinas and Philoponus to those of the Muslim commentators, Averroes and Avicenna. I will argue that this comparison reveals, once again, a very close parallel. Thirdly, in anticipation of her likely response that the religious biases to which she refers are shared by both Christian and Muslim commentators, a comparison will be made to the pagan commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Simplicius. This comparison will show, yet again, a tight parallel. Should these comparisons prove successful, then contrary to Nussbaum’s allegation of Christian bias, Aquinas’ reading of Aristotelian sense perception was actually shared by all the major commentators before him – Christians, Muslims, and pagans alike.

Finally, I will argue that this shared interpretation of Aristotelian sense perception by these commentators contradicts not only Nussbaum’s charge of Christian bias, but also her functionalist appropriation of Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis of sense perception. Nussbaum and other functionalists maintain that Aristotle’s outdated sensory physiology can be abandoned without compromising his philosophical explanation of sensation as a reception of form without matter. According to all the above commentators, however, Aristotle deduces the physical characteristics of sense organs from his philosophical analysis of receptivity in general, in terms of potency and act. If so, then his reasons for assigning these physical characteristics to sense organs are as philosophically foundational as hylomorphism itself. Accordingly, any contemporary attempt to incorporate Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis of sensation without his sensory physiology would, upon further analysis, exhibit signs of internal incoherence.

[10]  WITHDRAWN DUE TO ILLNESS. Christos Evangeliou, Towson University,

“Aristotle’s Defense of Democracy”

Abstract: Following his own method of inquiry, Aristotle felt compelled in the Politics to criticize Plato’s political doctrines. He would do so not only in the name of truth as he had done in the Ethics, but also for the benefit of students of political theory in general, and for the practitioners of the difficult political art.

It is my purpose in this paper to examine Aristotle’s defense of Democracy, suggested by his critique of Plato’s polity as articulated in the Laws, and not his more elaborate and severe critique of Plato’s polity in the Republic, with which I have already dealt elsewhere.

The main target of Aristotle’s critique is Plato’s polity, that is, the mixed constitution that aims at a balanced political mesotes by ‘mixing’ different aspects of democratic and oligarchic constitutions in some manner. In criticizig the Platonic «second best» polity as leaning toward Oligarchy, Aristotle clearly suggested that his preference was for the predominance of the democracic elements in the «mixing» of the various constitutions in order to achieve the «ariste politeia», which is the most durable and just polity.

[9]  Eugene Garver, Saint John’s University, MN

“Practical Knowledge and the Four Orientations to the Best”

Abstract: “In all the arts and sciences which embrace the whole of any subject, and do not come into being in a fragmentary way, it is the province of a single art or science to consider all that appertains to a single subject.” Thus begins Book IV of the Politics. Practical knowledge of politics, he goes on to say, has to consider the four possible orientations to the good that make any art or science complete, and those orientations will form the program of inquiry for the rest of the Politics. The four inquiries he outlines correspond to the four causes, and they organize Books IV-VIII. The first, “that which is best in the abstract” (haplôs) (1288b26), orients politics around the end of politics, the best life. The second, the best relative to circumstances, starts with the material cause and organizes political inquiry around the best that can be made out of given material. The third, the best on a hypothesis, starts not from the true end of politics, but any posited end, and so looks for means and devices that will preserve any given constitution. The final inquiry, the search for “the form of constitution which is best suited to states in general” articulates a formal cause that can organize almost any material, any kind of people.

These four inquiries will be practical in different ways. The best haplôs, which he also describes as the best in our prayers , presents the best polis as derived from its final cause, virtue and happiness. This is the subject of Books VII and VIII (e.g., VII.4.1325b33-39). The appropriate practical attitude towards such an ideal is indeed prayer, as we learn that the simply best state depends on conditions that cannot be the object of deliberation and planning.

Next, how to constitute a state under some given conditions looks at the best result of the application of efficient causes. The statesman here is like the gymnastic coach whose client wants to be in the best possible shape after years of neglect, and who is willing to do what it takes to get into good shape as long as it doesn’t take more than twenty minutes a day, and doesn’t involve stopping smoking. If the challenge to the best absolutely is to see how such knowledge can have anything to do with action, the challenge here is for the statesman to do anything other than pandering, giving the people what they want. The statesman meets that challenge by aiming not at happiness but at stability and preservation of the given constitution in the face of factions and the threat of revolution. Books V and VI explicitly address this facet of political science (V.1.1301a19-25). The best state is the most stable one. If one were to ask how political philosophy could be practical, I would think that most answers would by variations on these two projects, either describing an ideal constitution or giving advice on how any ruler can stay in power and any constitution be preserved.

The other two kinds of best are less obvious kinds of practical projects, and just how they are practical will be one of my main concerns here. They are less obvious because they understand political life as neither natural nor artificial. The more natural a polis, the closer the four causes come to coinciding. That is the ideal of Books VII and VIII. The more the polis seems an artifact, the more distinct the causes have to be, as the argument of Books V and VI display. Book I showed how the state is natural, but also showed some of the limitations of understanding the state as natural. Book II looked at the state as an artifact, and showed the limitations of that mode of understanding. The more narrowly political understandings of politics will be at work in Book IV itself as it explores the other two orientations towards the good.

The best relative to circumstances, the third kind of best, is a practical inquiry oriented to the material cause: given the material of a state, in particular the different classes that comprise the body of citizens, what is the best possible constitution for that state? That inquiry resembles the project of Book V in its emphasis on circumstances, but the crucial difference is that the practical project in Book V is subordinate to the desires (epithumia) of the rulers (1288b17) rather than what in fact harmonizes (harmottousa) with the people (1288b25). For the circumstantial best of Book IV, the trainer might see that one person’s absence of fast twitch muscles will make her into a good distance runner, and not a good sprinter; the statesman here will similarly see in the material of a state’s social and economic classes what the best constitution for that material would be. (The trainer in Book V might not even tell his client to stop smoking.)

The best in general, finally, looks for a formal cause, an organization of the constitution suitable for most conditions. It is my thesis that these last two inquiries, the formal and material, the best in general and the best in particular circumstances, are both accomplished in Book IV. While the correlation of the best haplôs with Books VII and VIII and of the best on a hypothesis with Books V and VI is clear, how Book IV does the work of both the other two sides of political knowledge, whether seriatem or together, is not so clear, nor the sense in which such a study could be practical.

It is surprising that those two kinds of knowledge, the best in particular circumstances and the best in general, the material and the formal cause, go together. As Aristotle announces the general program in IV.1-2, he suggests that there will be four distinct treatments of the best constitution, corresponding to the four kinds of best. But that is not what happens. Instead, by knowing about what constitution best suits a given people, we can draw as a corollary what is the best constitution in general, that is, the best constitution for poleis that are not unusually lucky, like the polis of Books VII and VIII, or unusually constrained in their choices, as the constitutions of Books V and VI are. That is how the argument of Book IV proceeds.

[8] Owen Goldin, Marquette University

“Aristotle on First Philosophy and the Imagination”

Abstract: Aristotle was the first to understand isolate metaphysics (“first philosophy” or “wisdom”) as a distinct branch of philosophy with its own object of study, Sometimes this is said to be “what is insofar as it is” (Meta. 4.1 1003a21) and sometimes immaterial substances (Meta. 5.1).  Aristotle was also the first to distinguish and discuss an aspect of human psychology that specifically pertaining to mental images, this being the phantasia, traditionally translated "imagination."  He was also the first one to make the claim that thought, in general, requires images.  So it might seem a straightforward matter to attribute to Aristotle the view that metaphysical thinking requires the use of images, and to proceed directly to the questions of what these images are and what role they play.  But a little digging reveals a number of difficulties.  For the immaterial substances, which constitute at least part of the subject matter of metaphysics, are apparently in principle knowable by human beings, but, because they are imperceptible, are not the sort of thing for which there can be images.  Further, it is hard to see how Aristotle's more abstract exercises in ontology – his speculations concerning form, matter, actuality and potentiality, and causation – are accompanied by images.  In this paper I begin to explore this issue by considering aspects of Aristotle’s psychology and the nature of his own metaphysical investigations.

[12]  Kristen A. Inglis, Cornell University,

“Natural Slavery Psychology and Rational Wish in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics”

Abstract: In this paper I argue for an interpretation of Aristotelian rational wish (boulêsis) on which rational wish is a desire of the rational part, a desire resulting from an agent’s engaging in reasoned reflection about the human good. To defend this account of rational wish, I use as my primary piece of evidence what may seem to be a rather irrelevant passage: viz., Politics 3.9 1280a31-4, where Aristotle states that natural slaves, like animals, do not “live by decision” (tou zên kata prohairesin.) I argue that the best interpretation of this claim is that slaves are incapable of having decisions (prohaireseis); I then argue that the best explanation for Aristotle’s holding this view is that he understands rational wish, decision’s underlying desiderative component, to be a desire resulting from reasoned reflection about the human good, a kind of reasoning of which he thinks natural slaves incapable. My line of reasoning relies on appeals to Aristotle’s comments about natural slave moral psychology, along with the empirical evidence about so-called natural slaves that would have influenced and constrained his account of natural slave moral psychology.

This interpretation of rational wish as a desire resulting from reasoned reflection about the human good has important implications for our understanding of Aristotelian ethics. For Aristotle’s ethical works make it clear that it is characteristic of the morally virtuous person to make decisions of certain kinds; in arguing that that a rational wish is an attitude that has its origins in reasoning about the good, then, I show that the virtuous person’s decisions have their origins not in pre-rational pleasure and pain training (as commentators such as William Fortenbaugh1 and Marguerite Deslauriers have argued), but rather in correct reasoning. In this way, my account of wish implies that the intellect has a major role to play in virtue of character; if my view of rational wish is right, then virtue of character is as much an excellent condition of the rational part as it is a condition of the non-rational part.

[4]  William Jaworski, Fordham University

“Aristotle and the Philosophy of Mind: Hylomorphism, Physicalism, Emergentism, and Modern Biology”

Abstract: Many philosophers have had the idea that Aristotle’s psychology has resources that could help us resolve problems in contemporary philosophy of mind and action theory. Over the past fifty years, however, Aristotle’s psychology has been interpreted in a variety of mutually inconsistent ways: as a form of substance dualism (Howard Robinson), a type of dual-attribute theory (Jonathan Barnes), an identity theory (Thomas Slakey), a functionalist theory (Edwin Hartman, Kathleen Wilkes, Marc Cohen), a form of neoparallelism (G.R.T. Ross), panpsychism (Myles Burnyeat), a view based on a strange ontology that is incoherent (Herbert Granger), a view that waffles between incoherence and nonreductive physicalism (Bernard Williams) – the list goes on. One explanation for this plurality of opinion is that our contemporary philosophical concepts are so thoroughly informed by post-Cartesian modes of thinking that they help us little in understanding a pre-Cartesian view. This would also explain why scholars who are capable of explaining Aristotle’s views with admirable clarity in Aristotle’s own terms often have difficulty bringing his ideas to bear on contemporary problems or evaluating the merits of those ideas over against their contemporary competitors. The result is that Aristotelian psychology has seldom been brought to bear on contemporary problems in a fruitful way. The goals of this paper are twofold. First, I aim to clear one of the obstacles that has stood in the way of bringing Aristotelian insights to bear on problems in action theory and philosophy of mind: confusion about what distinguishes hylomorphism from nonreductive physicalism and classic emergentism. Second, I present an argument in favor of hylomorphism, one that to my knowledge has never appeared in the literature. It appeals to work in biology and biological subdisciplines such as neuroscience.

[14] Johanna Luttrell, University of Oregon

“On Desire in the Nicomachean Ethics”

Abstract: The dichotomy between reason and desire is an old one, and well entrenched in our common-sense notions of ethics.  It should not, however, be read into Aristotle. Too often, a modern sensibility stemming from versions of Kant’s deontology is imported onto Aristotle, which diminishes the important role of desire in a well-lived life.  This paper will attempt a reading of Aristotle unclouded by such modern projections, in order to understand the place of desire in a virtuous person.

To approach this understanding, I will outline the Greek notion of choice, prohairesis, in relation to virtue, by tracing the weight, import, and meaning of desire in books II, III, VI, VII, and X of the Ethics.  I will show that Aristotle carves out a space for desire so that it inhabits, or perhaps traverses, the gulf between the appetitive and intellectual parts of the soul. In placing desire within this mediating position, the hope is that all the powers of the soul could act in harmony, or, moreover, that the virtuous life, the happy life, and the pleasurable life could be lived by the same person.  In order for this happy confluence to occur, we must show what we mean by desire.  The medievals translated all desire, orexis, as appetitus.  This translation obscured the fact that only one species of desire, epithumia, is strictly appetitive. In Aristotle, all desire operates by the law of growth, but each kind differs in the degree they are attached to an object or end.  Epithumia, as an uncultivated, dispersed want associated with lack, can fail to attach itself to the correct object or pleasure and so tend towards destructive passion.  But the threat to reason associated with an uninhibited appetite need not apply to all kinds of desire. Orexis, translated roughly as a kind of striving or reaching out and as a way of being at work, is something akin to creative longing, the desire to know.  It has a significant part to play in choice of ethical action because it can be cultivated to tend toward the correct end, which is, of course, human well being, eudaimonia.  I wish to emphasize significance and possibilities of orexis in reasonable deliberation, because an acknowledgement and cultivation of desire allows us to be faithful to our constitution as human beings with longings in accordance not merely with intellectual principles, but all parts of the soul.

[3] Prof. Joseph Novak, University of Waterloo,

“Minds in Aristotle: Mechanized or Personified?”

Abstract: More than two decades ago, Rolf George published the Nachlass of Franz Brentano under the title Ueber Aristoteles (Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986).  The work, close to 600 pages in length surveys a wide range of topics in Aristotle, including much pertaining to his metaphysics, ethics, and psychology.  Brentano has always been a provocative, albeit highly insightful,  interpreter of Aristotle, especially with regard to the notions of mind in God, man, and the Intelligences.  Aristotle sometimes gives the impression that cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, function in  an almost mechanical fashion, despite their intentional characteristics.  The aim of the current paper is to examine what light Brentano can bring to understanding the relationship between mind and personhood by sketching his position on the nature, characteristics, and role of divine, celestial and human persons in the Aristotelian universe.

[7] Prof. Thomas M. Olshewsky, University of Kentucky (emeritus)

“The Actualization of Action”

Abstract: The standard picture, from Alexander of Aphrodisias, is that the soul is a first actuality of the body, a fulfillment of the materials’ potentiality, and that the activity of the soul is a second actuality as a performance of the first actuality’s proper functions. This dual actuality picture is blocked by Aristotle’s own argument in Metaphysics VII-13 against multiple actualities in a single individual. This in turn informs the contentions of On the Soul III-9 against conceiving functions in terms of parts of the soul, and enables him to treat the soul-as-a-whole as the unified cause of activity (415b8-12) while still analyzing the organs and their objects as the starting place for inquiry. His “fresh start”, then, treats organisms as exhibiting life by virtue of their proper activities (413a20-30).

This treatment of the soul as the source, end and definition of its natural activities seems compromised by the development of dual dispositionalities in the latter part of the psychology. In-so-far as the aesthetikon requires the aesthekon for its enactment, the source of the activity seems primarily with the object of the action rather than with the subject. This is complicated for locomotion, which appears to have a two-stage process for the actualization of the action. First the orexis itself must be brought into being by bringing together the actualizations of both orekton and orektikon. This dual actualization need not be conceived as potential for action, since the determination of the orexis leads straight away to the action. Still, it leaves open the question of whether such other directed sources for action can still be incorporated into Aristotle’s neat definition for natural motion.

[10] Richard C. Taylor, Marquette University,

“Burnyeat and Averroes on Aristotle’s Intellect”

Abstract: In his 2008 Aquinas lecture at Marquette University entitled “Aristotle’s Divine Intellect,“ Miles Burnyeat set forth a novel account of Aristotle’e understanding of human and divine intellect.  Though there are considerable differences between Averroes and Burnyeat on a number of issues, these two Aristotelian commentators much separated by time and by culture are in agreement on at least two issues: the necessary perishability of the human intellect and the nature of God as a final cause in relation to human intellect.

This paper (1) provides a summary account of the views of Burnyeat, (2) sets forth a brief account of teachings by key figures in the Arabic tradition up to Averroes, (3) recounts the teachings of Averroes on intellect, and (3) concludes with remarks on God, intellect and final causality in Aristotle as understood by Burnyeat and Averroes.

[13]  Franco Trivigno, Marquette University,

“Aristotle on Anger”

Abstract: In this paper, I offer a close reading and analysis of Aristotle’s account of anger in Book II of the Rhetoric.  He defines anger as “a desire accompanied by pain for an apparent revenge for an apparent slighting of the things concerning oneself or one’s friends when such slighting is inappropriate” (II.2).   My analysis is guided by the question of in what sense anger is or can be reasonable.  First, I will formulate my question more precisely through a brief look at what Aristotle says about the relationship between emotion (pathē) and judgment (doxa) more generally.  Then, I will analyze the definition itself: there are no fewer than five scholarly controversies regarding the meaning of the definition itself, and so I will spend a good chunk of time trying to work through these as a way into the question of the reasonableness of anger.  The controversies regard: (1) the text and sense of what I (following Jebb) translate as “the things concerning oneself or one’s friends (tōn eis auton ē tōn autou); (2) the grammar and sense of what I (again following Jebb) take as “when such slighting is inappropriate (tou oligōrein mē prosēkontos)”; (3) the meaning and scope of slight, or oligōria; (4) the meaning and scope of revenge, or timōrias; and (5) the meaning of apparent, or phainomenēs/ēn, which occurs twice in the definition.   In the end, I argue that, on the Aristotelian view, anger expresses and is open to reasons, more particularly moral reasons, even though it is not constituted by such reasons.  In other words, anger is neither an irrational, knee-jerk response to the perception of a certain kind of harm nor a fully cognitive evaluation of a moral situation; rather it is the emotional expression of our rational, moral agency.  

[6]  Julie Ward, Loyola University of Chicago,

“Perceiving the Beacon as Enemy: Perception and Action in DA III 7”

Abstract: In some difficult lines in De Anima III, 7, Aristotle states: “for example, seeing that the beacon is lit, you recognize, seeing it moving, that it is the enemy” (431b5-6). Aristotle goes on to mention other cases of calculating, using images (phantasmata) or thoughts (noemata), as if you are seeing them presently (431b6-8).  Among the interpretive problems here presented is that of MSS variations, for example, some read “…you recognize by the common sense (te koine)…” while others, following Bywater, delete this phrase.  The central problem, however, concerns its philosophical meaning: how is it possible to perceive the moving, lit beacon as the enemy?  For, by his own strictures, special sense-perception is incapable of relating a common predicate to a special sense object.  Two possibilities are brought to mind, one involving the faculty of the common sense, the other, that of phantasia.  Yet the account of how either faculty, in conjunction with special perception, is capable of producing decision and action remains unclear. These lines, and the larger passage encompassing them at 431b2-b10, are sufficiently complex as to warrant close critical attention.

[15]  James Wood, Boston University,

“The Interdependence of Theoretical and Moral Excellence”

Abstract: In this paper I argue that excellent action necessarily depends upon excellent theoretical inquiry and vice-versa.  This position seems to contradict the argument of the Nicomachean Ethics itself, but as I will attempt to show, Aristotle's full account of excellent theory and practice prevents a rigid separation between the two.  Thought and desire, the virtues of theoretical and practical thought, and theoretical and moral virtue are all interdependent and necessary aspects of the happy human life.  They are unified, specifically, in the beautiful (to kalon) as the highest object of both practical and theoretical thought, the source of right desire, and the end of excellent action.  My argument has four main parts:

1.Moral desire depends upon excellent practical thought.  Although thought itself moves nothing, desire itself is blind, and so incapable of moving morally (cf. VI.13, 1144b8-14).  Desire in general is impossible without some perception of the object of desire, which is furnished by thought or imagination (On the Soul III.10, esp. 433b10-12; Metaphysics 12.7, 1072a27-30).  The desired object in the case of all moral actions is to kalon (IV.1, 1120a23-4, et al.).  The task of phronēsis is to guide this desire by seeing how it can be obtained practically (1145a5-6, et al.).  Consequently, phronēsis must perceive the beautiful in particular practical circumstances in order for desire to incite moral action.

2.Excellent practical thought depends upon noetic insight.  Phronēsis deals with universals as well as particulars (VI.7, 1141b14-22), because universal premises are involved in moral reasoning (VII.3), and the achievements of legislators (as well as moral philosophers) would be impossible without insight into such universals (cf. I.2, I.13, VI.8, X.9).  If the conclusion is to yield virtuous action, both major and minor premises must accord with the moral end, beauty, so phronēsis must perceive the beautiful on both levels.  Phronēsis therefore shares in or is informed by nous, that aspect of sophia, theoretical excellence (VI.7), that discerns both ultimate particulars (eschata) and universal first principles (archai) and derives the latter from the former (VI.3, 1139b26-36; 6, 1140b31-1141a8; 11, 1143a35-1143b5).

3.Moral action depends upon excellent theoretical thought.  The highest moral principle is not a beautiful premise but the beautiful reality that grounds all such premises and renders them moral.  This reality is the highest object of theōria; for as Aristotle says, nous at the highest level grasps the most “beautiful and divine things” (X.7, 1177a12-17).  As the Metaphysics (XII.7) confirms, the highest beauty coincides with the highest reality, and just as its goodness and beauty imparts movement to the cosmos as a final cause, so too is our movement, along with our deliberative action, prompted by insight into the beautiful; and the truer the insight the better the resulting action. Such insight is theoretical, yet it grounds the most excellent practice.

4.Excellent theoretical thought depends upon excellent moral action. Theoretical excellence is supported and prepared for initially by practical excellence (cf. VI.13, 1145a6-11; X.9, 1179b7-10, 23-31), both because the point of insight into universal beauty is particular manifestations of beauty, and because, as Aristotle puts it, the eye of the soul is clarified or obscured depending on the state of one's character (cf. III.12, 1119b8-12, VI.5, 1140b11-20, VI.12,1144a31-36, VII.8, 1151a15-17).  Repeated right action results in the good habits and characteristics that clarify insight into the beautiful.  Progressive insight into the beauty in particular actions and situations results in an increasing appreciation of beauty itself; in turn, the more beauty is grasped and understood noetically in excellent theōria, the more desire for the beautiful is whetted.  Consequently excellent action and excellent theoretical inquiry are mutually reinforcing and mutually productive of the beautification and perfection of human nature, or in short, of eudaimonia.

[2]  Karen Zwier, University of Pittsburgh,

“Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism: Putting Human Deliberation into Action”

Abstract:  The Aristotelian corpus contains a substantial number of comments on and examples of what we refer to as the “practical syllogism”. The traditional reading of the practical syllogism is based on the assumption that the practical syllogism is a model both for human deliberation (in the ethical context) and for animal motion (i.e. how the soul, in general, moves the body). Klaus Corcilius has recently (2008) pointed out several problems with the traditional view and proposed an alternative, which he calls the “non-two-jobs view”: his view is that the practical syllogism is intended to explain animal motion in general, but is not a device for explaining deliberation or practical thinking in the human case. In this paper, I examine both the traditional view and Corcilius’ “non-two-jobs view”, and I find each to have several failings that make them unsatisfactory. I propose my own view, which I call the “ποίησις view”. I see this view as an expansion and slight alteration of the view advocated by John Cooper (1975). My thesis is that the practical syllogism is neither a model for human deliberation nor an explanation of animal motion in general, but rather an explanation of human action. The practical syllogism, on my view, illustrates what happens when a human finds himself in the appropriate circumstances for carrying out a decision that was previously arrived at through deliberation. In promoting the “ποίησις view”, I place special emphasis on texts from De Motu Animalium and from De Anima.