JULIUS
CAESAR:
THE LAST DICTATOR

 

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CHAPTER 2.2: GAUL TO THE RUBICON

Coin allgedly representing Vercingetorix, head of the Gallic alliance.

One or two summers can bind the whole of Gaul to us with everlasting chains, through hope or fear, punishment or rewards, weapons or laws. But if the situation is left unresolved, without the finishing touches, then however much cut back, those people will break out again and reopen the war with fresh vigour...Caesar has now done enough to satisfy his own requirements, but not those of the state; and since he is prepared to wait to enjoy the fruits of his labours rather than give up his state office half-completed, we should not upset things by recalling a general who is set on serving the state well, nor interrupt the unfolding of a comprehensive Gallic policy which is already near completion. Cicero, Prov. Cos. 34-35, quoted in Saaben-Clair, 89.

VERCINGETORIX AND THE GALLIC ALLIANCE

While Rome flared in unrest following the murder of Publius Clodius in January, 52, Gaul rose in in a firestorm of renewed, united rebellion under the brilliant Avernian leader, Vercingetorix. Caesar concentrated all his efforts to destroy the great Gaul's confederacy. For the next 18 months, events in Rome would have to wait upon almost constant, ever more savage, battles against almost every major tribe in Long-haired Gaul. Caesar captured Avaricum; was forced to abandon the siege of Gergovia with heavy losses; was victorious in the neighborhood of Dijon; and finally surrounded Vercingetorix and much of his army in Alesia, fighting off the combined Celtic levies attempting to relieve him in one of the most brilliant sieges in history. He accepted the surrender of Vercingetorix, who walked in Caesar's Gallic triumph six years later before his ritual murder. All through 51 Caesar fought with increasing brutality to bring the remaining Gallic tribes under control, while in Rome the Optimates begin repeated attempts in the Senate to prematurely end his command. Perhaps in response to these attempts, Caesar began publication of his own version of his accomplishments in roughly 52, the first of his seven books on the Gallic Wars. It is likely he used the annual drafts of the reports he had been required to send to the Senate since taking command. In them he cooly estimated that over a million Gauls had been killed, a further million enslaved, in the eight years of his campaigns.

The year 50 brought the tensions of the state to breaking point. Throughout the year, the Optimates, headed by Cato, Bibulus and the Consul Marcellus, repeatedly moved to recall Caesar and bring him to trial. Only Caesar's client tribune, C. Curio, prevented the passing of a decree by repeatedly imposing a veto. His proposals were simple: if Caesar [an alleged danger to the state] must give up his armies, then Pompey [once considered such] must also give up his legions. Two of Caesar’s legions had, in fact, been “loaned” him from Pompey’s army in the days of the triumvirate. The anti-Caesarians deftly agreed that Pompey would cooperate by giving up one of his legions – coincidentally, the one remaining with Caesar. Thus Caesar effectively lost two loyal legions, which cost Pompey nothing.

The nervous tension built throughout that fateful year. Cicero, governing Cilicia but frantically seeking information, wrote and received invaluable letters from which help us almost know almost month by month the state of the growing breach between Pompey (now firmly on the side of the Optimates) and Caesar (playing for time and hoping for accommodation). By the end of the year, when the decision for or against Caesar was imminent, Cicero's letters and Caesar's own writings give vivid snapshots of the granite impasse between the two men:

[From Caesar's message to Pompey, December 50] It made me angry that my enemies should, out of spite, wrest from me a privilege conferred by the Roman people and, robbing me of six months of my command, drag me back to Rome, when the people had decreed that I should be allowed to stand [for election] in absentia at the next elections." Caesar, Civil War, 1.9 (2)[Saaben-Clare].

 

" For he thinks Caesar will turn everything topsy-turvy even if he is elected consul after dismissing his army . . . if Caesar does lose his head all the same, Pompey feels only the deepest contempt for him, trusting in his own and the state's troops . . .[regarding Antony's recent attacks on Pompey] 'What do you think Caesar himself will do if he comes to control the state when his poor, wretched quaestor dares to say such things?'"

  Cicero to Atticus, 7.8 [Saaben-Clare].  

Cicero was horrified at the approaching disaster, and in his letter to Atticus of December 26/27 (mere days before the Rubicon) rather pathetically took both sides of the argument himself, concluding "'Then we must give way to Caesar's wishes.' But just think of his first consulship and then imagine him being consul again. 'Ah yes' you say, 'weak as he then was, he was more than a match for the whole state.' So what do you think he will be like now?" Cicero to Atticus, 7.9 [Saaben-Clare].

Meanwhile, Gaius Marcellus, consul for December, noted that Caesar had casually moved his headquarters to Ravenna, ostensibly to hear legal cases in Cisalpine Gaul. Curio, whose latest move was to suggest that both Pompey and Caesar lay down their commands, forced a vote in the Senate, which fell resoundingly in favor of peace; by a vote of 370 to 22, it was agreed that both proconsuls should retire. Marcellus merely overlooked the vote and went straight to Pompey, offering him Rome’s sword to defend her from Caesar’s anticipated actions. On December 10, Curio’s term as tribune ended, but Caesar's deputy, Antony, took over, still regularly imposing the tribune’s veto to derail motions against Caesar. The posturing on both sides was unrelenting. Caesar was willing to do almost anything to be - or to appear to be - accommodating. His final offer was that, as a compromise, he would give up eight legions and command in Transalpine Gaul. He even offered to keep merely two legions and Cisalpine Gaul – or at least one legion and Illyricum - until he could be elected consul.  It was too late.

"LET THE DICE FLY HIGH!"

In the first days of January 49, motions were renewed to strip Caesar of his command. This time, the majority of the Senate voted against Caesar’s most recent offer and ignored the vetoes of his two tribunes of the plebs, who were physically roughed up in the turmoil. The inviolable veto of the tribunes had been infringed. Antony and Caelius, together with Curio, immediately left to bring word to Caesar that the Senate had formally declared against him.

The news reached Caesar at Ravenna with lightning speed, probably on January 10, 49 BC. It must have been clear to him that the senatorial party was now placing the greatest legal authority of the Empire in the hands of his enemies. Suetonius states that Caesar immediately and secretly left Ravenna after sunset (having previously sent ahead 10 cohorts of his soldiers towards Ariminum, across the border into Italy). The southern frontier of Caesar’s province was the small, northern Italian stream called Rubicon which Caesar’s party reached at dawn. Caesar hesitated for a long time on the "legal" side of that small stream. What his thoughts were cannot be guessed. When he crossed the bridge, Caesar would become, not the national hero and revered general of many legions, but an enemy of the state. Although he had bent the Republic's rules, he had never broken them. To a man who prized his position among his peers and in history above all things, Caesar must have known that he would be forever stigmatized for marching against his native land. He had used every maneuver in his arsenal to avoid it. One of the most famous images in history is of Caesar pausing on the northern side of the river, telling his staff,” We may still draw back but once across that little bridge, we shall have to fight it out.”

 

The Rubicon River in northern Italy, separating Italy from Cisalpine Gaul

As Gelzer writes,

 

" "Let the dice fly high!" he said (quoting a half-line of his favorite Greek poet, Menander), as he crossed the Rubicon…the great gamble could now begin; for he was starting a civil war and, according to the view occasionally expressed in his works, 'Luck is the greatest power in all things and especially in war.' Admittedly, in another passage, he adds that human endeavor could lend luck a helping hand, and the knowledge that he would not be found wanting in this respect will have filled him with confidence." "

  Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman.  

As the Gallic Wars had made Caesar's military prowess the stuff of household fame, so Vercingetorix and the Gallic alliance, in their first and last great attempt at confederacy, showed barbarians throughout the Roman world that, even when united, Rome could not be defeated when led by generals of genius. It is impossible to imagine Caesar's future career without the political capital, wealth and fighting skills he earned while contesting with the warriors of Gaul for its future. It is impossible to imagine the future history of France, Belgium, and so many countries of Western Europe without Caesar's drive to be first in Rome

 

  Suzanne Cross © 2001-2008. All Rights Reserved.
No material may be used without the author's permission.