
Coin allgedly representing Vercingetorix, head of the Gallic alliance. |
One or two summers can bind the whole of Gaul to us with everlasting chains, through hope or fear, punishment or rewards, weapons or laws. But if the situation is left unresolved, without the finishing touches, then however much cut back, those people will break out again and reopen the war with fresh vigour...Caesar has now done enough to satisfy his own requirements, but not those of the state; and since he is prepared to wait to enjoy the fruits of his labours rather than give up his state office half-completed, we should not upset things by recalling a general who is set on serving the state well, nor interrupt the unfolding of a comprehensive Gallic policy which is already near completion. Cicero, Prov. Cos. 34-35, quoted in Saaben-Clair, 89. |
VERCINGETORIX AND THE GALLIC ALLIANCE
While Rome flared in unrest following the
murder of Publius Clodius in January, 52, Gaul rose in in a firestorm of renewed, united
rebellion under the brilliant Avernian leader, Vercingetorix. Caesar concentrated
all his efforts to destroy the great Gaul's confederacy. For the
next 18 months, events in Rome would have to wait upon almost
constant, ever more savage, battles against almost every major
tribe in Long-haired Gaul. Caesar captured Avaricum; was forced
to abandon the siege of Gergovia with heavy losses; was victorious
in the neighborhood of Dijon; and finally surrounded Vercingetorix
and much of his army in Alesia,
fighting off the combined Celtic levies attempting to relieve
him in one of the most brilliant sieges in history. He accepted
the surrender of Vercingetorix, who walked in Caesar's Gallic
triumph six years later before his ritual murder. All through
51 Caesar fought with increasing brutality to bring the remaining
Gallic tribes under control, while in Rome the Optimates begin
repeated attempts in the Senate to prematurely end his command.
Perhaps in response to these attempts, Caesar began publication
of his own version of his accomplishments in roughly 52, the first
of his seven books on the Gallic Wars. It is likely he used the
annual drafts of the reports he had been required to send to the
Senate since taking command. In them he cooly estimated that over
a million Gauls had been killed, a further million enslaved, in
the eight years of his campaigns.
The
year 50 brought the tensions of the state to breaking point. Throughout
the year, the Optimates, headed by Cato,
Bibulus and the Consul Marcellus, repeatedly moved to recall Caesar
and bring him to trial. Only Caesar's client tribune, C. Curio,
prevented the passing of a decree by repeatedly imposing a veto.
His proposals were simple: if Caesar [an alleged danger to the
state] must give up his armies, then Pompey [once considered such]
must also give up his legions. Two of Caesar’s legions had, in
fact, been “loaned” him from Pompey’s army in the days of the
triumvirate. The anti-Caesarians deftly agreed that Pompey would
cooperate by giving up one of his legions – coincidentally, the
one remaining with Caesar. Thus Caesar effectively lost two loyal
legions, which cost Pompey nothing.
The nervous tension built throughout that fateful
year. Cicero, governing Cilicia but frantically seeking information,
wrote and received invaluable letters from which help us almost
know almost month by month the state of the growing breach between
Pompey (now firmly on the side of the Optimates) and Caesar (playing
for time and hoping for accommodation). By the end of the year,
when the decision for or against Caesar was imminent, Cicero's
letters and Caesar's own writings give vivid snapshots of the
granite impasse between the two men:
[From Caesar's message to Pompey, December 50] It
made me angry that my enemies should, out of spite, wrest from
me a privilege conferred by the Roman people and, robbing me of
six months of my command, drag me back to Rome, when the people
had decreed that I should be allowed to stand [for election] in
absentia at the next elections." Caesar, Civil
War, 1.9 (2)[Saaben-Clare].
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" For
he thinks Caesar will turn everything topsy-turvy
even if he is elected consul after dismissing his
army . . . if Caesar does lose his head all the
same, Pompey feels only the deepest contempt for
him, trusting in his own and the state's troops
. . .[regarding Antony's recent attacks on Pompey]
'What do you think Caesar himself will do if he
comes to control the state when his poor, wretched
quaestor dares to say such things?'" |
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Cicero to Atticus, 7.8 [Saaben-Clare]. |
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Cicero was horrified at the approaching disaster,
and in his letter to Atticus of December 26/27 (mere days before
the Rubicon) rather pathetically took both sides of the argument
himself, concluding "'Then we must
give way to Caesar's wishes.' But just think of his first consulship
and then imagine him being consul again. 'Ah yes' you say, 'weak
as he then was, he was more than a match for the whole state.'
So what do you think he will be like now?" Cicero
to Atticus, 7.9 [Saaben-Clare].
Meanwhile, Gaius Marcellus, consul for December,
noted that Caesar had casually moved his headquarters to Ravenna,
ostensibly to hear legal cases in Cisalpine Gaul. Curio, whose
latest move was to suggest that both Pompey and Caesar lay down
their commands, forced a vote in the Senate, which fell resoundingly
in favor of peace; by a vote of 370 to 22, it was agreed that
both proconsuls should retire. Marcellus merely overlooked the
vote and went straight to Pompey, offering him Rome’s sword to
defend her from Caesar’s anticipated actions. On December 10,
Curio’s term as tribune ended, but Caesar's deputy, Antony,
took over, still regularly imposing the tribune’s veto to derail
motions against Caesar. The posturing on both sides was unrelenting.
Caesar was willing to do almost anything to be - or to appear
to be - accommodating. His final offer was that, as a compromise,
he would give up eight legions and command in Transalpine Gaul.
He even offered to keep merely two legions and Cisalpine Gaul
– or at least one legion and Illyricum - until he could be elected
consul. It was too late.
"LET THE DICE FLY HIGH!"
In
the first days of January 49, motions were renewed to strip Caesar
of his command. This time, the majority of the Senate voted against
Caesar’s most recent offer and ignored the vetoes of his two tribunes
of the plebs, who were physically roughed up in the turmoil. The
inviolable veto of the tribunes had been infringed. Antony and
Caelius, together with Curio, immediately left to bring word to
Caesar that the Senate had formally declared against him.
The news reached Caesar at Ravenna with lightning
speed, probably on January 10, 49 BC. It must have been clear
to him that the senatorial party was now placing the greatest
legal authority of the Empire in the hands of his enemies. Suetonius
states that Caesar immediately and secretly left Ravenna after
sunset (having previously sent ahead 10 cohorts of his soldiers
towards Ariminum, across the border into Italy). The southern
frontier of Caesar’s province was the small, northern Italian
stream called Rubicon which Caesar’s party reached at dawn. Caesar
hesitated for a long time on the "legal" side of that
small stream. What his thoughts were cannot be guessed. When he
crossed the bridge, Caesar would become, not the national hero
and revered general of many legions, but an enemy of the state.
Although he had bent the Republic's rules, he had never broken them. To a man who prized his position among his peers and in history
above all things, Caesar must have known that he would be forever stigmatized for
marching against his native land. He had used every maneuver in
his arsenal to avoid it. One of the most famous images in history
is of Caesar pausing on the northern side of the river, telling
his staff,” We may still draw back
but once across that little bridge, we shall have to fight it
out.”

The Rubicon River in northern
Italy, separating Italy from Cisalpine Gaul
As Gelzer writes,
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" "Let
the dice fly high!" he said (quoting a half-line
of his favorite Greek poet, Menander), as he crossed
the Rubicon…the great gamble could now begin; for
he was starting a civil war and, according to the
view occasionally expressed in his works, 'Luck
is the greatest power in all things and especially
in war.' Admittedly, in another passage, he adds
that human endeavor could lend luck a helping hand,
and the knowledge that he would not be found wanting
in this respect will have filled him with confidence." " |
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Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman. |
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As the Gallic Wars had made Caesar's military
prowess the stuff of household fame, so Vercingetorix and the
Gallic alliance, in their first and last great attempt at confederacy,
showed barbarians throughout the Roman world that, even when united,
Rome could not be defeated when led by generals of genius. It
is impossible to imagine Caesar's future career without the political
capital, wealth and fighting skills he earned while contesting
with the warriors of Gaul for its future. It is impossible to
imagine the future history of France, Belgium, and so many countries
of Western Europe without Caesar's drive to be first in Rome