Few figures in Roman history had the unforeseen historical impact of these two brothers, whose careers prefigured so much of what led to the fall of the Roman Republic. Proud sons of one of Rome's first families, each attempted to introduce new solutions to Rome's problems, working within the political system; each ended his life in political murder and riot. From Sir Ronald Syme on, historians have recognized the great watershed that in Roman history represented by the careers of the Brothers Gracchi. Caesar's career is unthinkable without them; Augustus built upon what the Gracchi began. It is easy to make such generalizations, but many books on their lives show the truth was far more complex and interesting. No one, however, denies that their history is important in the rolls of Roman events. As the Oxford Classical Dictionary states, their careers marked ".the beginnings of 'the Roman Revolution': the introduction of murder into politics and the breakdown of concordia [the tradition of not pushing legal powers to extremes] on which the Republic was based." Or as Velleius Paterculus wrote over a century later, speaking of Gaius (though also for Tiberius),

Sons of a famous father (twice Consul and Censor) and a patrician mother, Cornelia (daughter of legendary war hero Scipio Africanus the Elder, who defeated Hannibal), Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and his younger brother, Gaius, spanned the period of roughly 137 to 121 BC Significant problems existed in the middle and later decades of the second century. Rome had finally conquered and razed Carthage after nearly a century of repeated wars of conquest. It was now acquiring the territorial dominions that would lead to worldwide Empire. Yet the machinery of Roman administration, led by the patrician Senate and plebeians, was increasingly ineffective dealing effectively with overseas dominions. For a century, small landowners had been taken repeatedly from their lands into Rome's armies, to the decline and extinction of their farms. There was frequent agitation against the perceived inequality of the agrarian laws. Wealthy landowners bought up the farms, installing slaves in the place of the independent farmer. Landless, jobless, thousands drifted into Rome where they rotted and posed increasing threats to state stability. There was debt, corruption, and lack of an assured food supply for Rome. It was becoming increasingly hard to find enough citizen soldiers to man Rome's enhanced armies. A growing frustration both among the lower classes, who felt disenfranchised, and the related Italian cities and regions, who sought and were denied full participation in Roman affairs, was creating deep-seated resentment and hardship.

The brothers were raised by their remarkable mother, Cornelia, who had borne 12 children and buried 9 after she was widowed. Plutarch speaks with admiration of their upbringing but, although the only surviving sons of a remarkable family, the brothers had their differences:

TIBERIUS SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS, C. 163-133 BC

The elder brother, Tiberius, had started his political career under his cousin, C. Scipio Aemilianus (adopted grandson of the famous Africanus). Later, when a quaestor in Spain, Tiberius used his connections to save the army by a treaty which, on motion of Scipio Aemilianus, the Senate refused to ratify and moved to censure Tiberius for his actions. Bitterly disappointed, the young Gracchus joined the party opposing Scipio, including some of Rome's most prominent Optimates (the nobility of Roman politics, with at least one consul in their family tree). Many in this party understood the need for reform; some cynically wished merely to oppose Scipio; some wished, surely, to use Tiberius for their own ends as a stalking-horse presenting reforms, to test the political waters. It is impossible to know now whether Tiberius was sincere, naive, idealistic, or cynical; whether he was using, or being used by, the Senators in his party. His later actions suggest he believed in his reforms, while at the same time he was certainly determined to restore his own dignitas, that combination of honor, fame, and political clout so highly valued in his class and time.

Gracchus was a powerful speaker, and his persuasive eloquence for his land reform bill was captured by Plutarch:

Although without the power to legislate (that belonged to the popular assemblies and their tribunes), the long tradition in Roman politics was to present legislation to the Senate for its consent and input, then to secure it through the vote of various assemblies of the people. This was one of the many legislative checks and balances that had the imprimatur of centuries' use. The first shock was that Gracchus chose to skip this step and, with the support of some members of his party, took these proposals directly to the plebs without first consulting the Senate. However reasonable his legislation, this was a direct slap at the Senate's authority, and a tribune promptly vetoed the measures. Now Gracchus took the measure back to the Senate, but he had lost critical support - the bills were voted down. Returning to the Assembly of the Plebs, Tribune M. Octavius (supporting hostile Senators in this case) persisted in his veto. Now, in a second shocking innovation, Gracchus attempted to remove Octavius from office. For 300 years and more, the Tribunes of the plebs had been inviolable - they could not be touched, harried, or threatened, and no politician had ever attempted to remove a Tribune from office while he was exercising his lawful duties. Yet Gracchus forced a vote to remove the tribune and, with his supporters, passed it. There may also have been personal bitterness involved - Tiberius and Octavius had apparently once been close friends. One of Gracchus' followers was elected in his place. Traditionalists were appalled, and in fact this would be one of the worst precedents for the future. Gracchus was tinkering with the very balance of power in the Roman state, and others less principled than he would follow beyond where he led. The agrarian laws were forced through, but much ill will remained. The Senate pulled strings to make actually implementing the law extremely difficult, including a refusal to provide sufficient funding for the commissioners, who had to compensate former owners.

Then, conveniently, Attalus III of Pergamum (Anatolia) died without successors and bequeathed his kingdom and all his property to the Roman people. Again, going to the Assembly, Tiberius proposed to use part of the money to fund his agrarian reforms. Many senators had looked to acquire additional riches and land and were outraged at events. His high-handedness offended many; his reforms enraged others. When Tiberius sought an unprecedented second term as tribune, opposition hardened against him. New reforms obsessed him, possibly with the desire to strike at the recalcitrant Senate: "These included a reduction of the period of military service, the right of appeal to the people from the verdicts of the juries, and the admission to juries - which had hitherto been composed exclusively of senators - of an equal number of knights. In short, Tiberius's program was designed to cripple the powers of the Senate in every possible way..." (Plutarch, 16). While seeking reelection, Gracchus was publicly assassinated on the steps of the Capitol by a mob of senators headed by patrician P. Scipio Nasica, who had convinced the Senate to follow and support him. His body and those of his dead supporters were contemptuously thrown into the Tiber, to rot without burial. Gracchus' supporters were later purged, murdered or otherwise punished by a commission in 32 BC., headed by then-Consul C. Popolius Laenas.

If Tiberius had made the first move against a fellow tribune, now the Senate of Rome had actively murdered one. The blow to its prestige was permanent. The Senate influenced by moral authority. To strike back at political opponents through violence would, in forty years, no longer be shocking - it would be commonplace. With the murder of Gracchus, the Senate took the first step in the decline of its own influence. The Roman people would not forget.

GAIUS SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS, 153-121 BC

Following his brother's murder, Gaius "at first withdrew completely from the Forum and played no part in public life. . . he stayed quietly at home, like a man who had been humbled. . ." (Plutarch, I). The feelings of a son who was now the sole remaining male in his family may be imagined. (Cicero would later write that Gaius was brought back into public life by a dream of his dead brother, who urged him that "Fate has decreed the same destiny for us both, to live and die in the service of the people.') He accepted the position as quaestor to the ex-Consul, Orentes, who served in Sardinia for two years as governor.

Gaius was roughly 21 years old when his elder brother was murdered; at age 30, he sought the same dangerous office of Tribune of the Plebs, and was elected in 123. In that capacity he resumed his brother's policies and added many of his own. A better speaker than his brother, and able to sway the crowds with great skill, Gaius had far more ambitious plans for legislative programs and administrative reforms than his brother. Exiling Popolius, the consul who had proceeded against his brother's followers, he proposed a law that all who had been deprived of any office by the people would, in future, be ineligible for any office at all. This ensured that corrupt Senators, or those guilty of popular disdain, would have their future careers curtailed. . He next struck at the power of the Senate by enacting that the judices (roughly, judges) be chosen, not from the Patrician class, but from the knights' or Equites' class. This ensured loss of both prestige and significant revenue to the Optimates. He further rearranged the whole taxation of the new province of Asia and won over the Roman mob by his subsidized grain law (which permitted every citizen to buy grain at half-price from the state). To relieve economic distress, he renewed his brother's agrarian law and set in hand a scheme of colonization (including re-founding Carthage). He passed legislation to protect provincials from the rapacity of magistrates. He was a notable orator (much admired by Cicero) and his legislative proposals found far more success than his brother. Many historians feel that he was moved not only by his own desire for political achievements, but by the need to redeem his brother's legislation and programs.

If land reform was the hot-button issue that had alienated Tiberius from the establishment, Gaius found an even more controversial issue. In 122, Gaius proposed giving the Roman citizenship to Latins and Latin status to Italian allies, both to protect them from Roman excesses and to enable them to participate in agrarian land distributions. This last move was violently unpopular with both the Senate and the people, who would show themselves violently against sharing their valued Roman citizenship with any other Italian people. Now the Senate moved covertly to destroy Gaius in popular opinion by inducing another tribune, Livius Drusus, to come up with his own versions of Gaius' proposals, even more liberal and even more popular with the people. Few historians believe that Livius' proposals were ever taken seriously by the Senators who put him up to it: it was a tactic merely to discredit Gaius with the mob. Between his stand for enfranchising the Italian allies and what now seemed less generous legislation, Gracchus did indeed begin losing his popular influence. Although he was quietly re-elected tribune for 122 (the issue had become less controversial since Tiberius' death), Gracchus ran for a third time as tribune and failed to win election for the year 121 BC. With his legislation under attack and in the face of overt Senatorial hostility, Gracchus began arming himself and his followers, thus providing the Senate with an excuse to strike back hard. His alleged "insurrection" was met with the first-ever use of what would become a standard tool of threatened Senators: the infamous senatus consultum ultimum (the "ultimate decree" of martial law). This law essentially gave to the Senate the same kind of martial law powers a dictator would use to defend the established order from external (or internal) threat. When Gaius and his supporters (estimated at several thousand) filled the Senate, a confrontation ensued and once again leading Senators resorted to violence to remove an insolent tribune. In a riot in the Forum led by followers of the Senatorial party, Gaius Gracchus was also murdered, and the following bloodbath by the Senate of his supporters was alleged to have claimed 3,000 lives.

Some historians blame the Gracchi for setting a train of events in motion that would later destroy the Roman Republic. The balance of powers between Senate and assemblies, nobles and commoners, was more fragile than Romans at the time believed. Whether by stepping upon the Senate's turf (regarding foreign policy, taxation and financing, or the simple moral suasion of asking the Senate first for approval of laws submitted to the people), there is no question that the Gracchi both preferred taking legislation directly to the people. They were thus responsible for upsetting that balance of power. Alternatively, it can be argued that the Gracchi led the first serious attempts to reform Roman constitutional weaknesses from within the system, and that the Senators proved themselves incapable of reform by their blatant resort to violence in removing both brothers and their adherents. Perhaps most dangerously, the relations between rich and poor, powerful and powerless, Italian and Roman, were embittered by Romans who saw in the murders of the Gracchi over a ten-year-period the hopelessness of seeking reforms through legal channels. The genie of political violence was out of the bottle; it would not go in again. From this time onward, the tensions between Senate and people became ever more embittered. Similarly, ambitious young tribunes without the principles of the Gracchi would make use of their position as rabble-rousers to enhance their own political careers.

The Gracchi in many way frame the argument between the status quo of the late Republic and attempts at reform. Their violent deaths were the first of many; their partisans ancestors of riots to come. Their legislation had unforeseen and occasionally destructive consequences. Traditional spheres of power had been attacked, and in the vacuum, new and ambitious combinations began to arise, without the former checks and balances traditional to the Republic's mos maoirum. The assassination of both brothers brought violence and partisan riot to the forefront in Roman politics. The former cooperation of the Senate began to fragment into faction. The stage was set for the civil wars to come and for a final heir of the Gracchi - Julius Caesar.