"The loser bears the burden of defeat;

The victor wins, but conquest is a crime."

The Pharsalia, Lucan, VII, 144-5.

A century after the Battle of Pharsalus, the poet Lucan considered it so pivotal to Roman history that he chose it for a poem-cycle of epic proportions, known as The Pharsalia. Its depiction of the war to the death between the noble Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus and the evil Caesar may be simplistic in historical terms but the poem is fascinating in showing that later Roman generations clearly regarded the Civil War defeat of Pompey's armies by Caesar at the Battle of Pharsalus as a turning point in the death of the Roman Republic.

Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, vanquished at Pharsalus

From January, 49 BC to Pharsalus (August 9, 48 by the Roman calendar but June 6 by the Julian calendar), Civil War between Pompey and Caesar had divided the Roman world with battles in Italy, Spain, Africa, Gaul, and now Greece. Only weeks before, Caesar's armies had suffered a serious defeat following a long, but unsuccessful, siege of Pompey's legions in the town of Dyrrhachium on the northern Greek coast. In breaking through the siege, Pompey might well have destroyed Caesar's veterans if he had relentlessly pursued the routed army; however, as Caesar contemptuously remarked after the battle, "Today the war would have been won by the enemy if they had a man who knew how to conquer." (Suetonius). Caesar withdrew without significant opposition to Thessaly where his army, severely hampered by inadequate supply during the months-long siege, could find abundant food and forage. It could also reunite with much-needed detached units of his command under Domitius Calvinus.

Meanwhile, Pompey had rejoined his own forces with those under Metellus Scipio and followed Caesar southwest into Greece towards the plains of a small trading town named Pharsalus, at the crossroads of major east-west trade routes (some historians, including Hirtius, claim it was Palaepharsalus or "old Pharsalus" a few miles away). Caesar had pitched camp on the plain outside the town, on the north bank of the Enipeus, after a harsh seven-day march. Pompey, arriving with an army totaling over 45,000 to Caesar's estimated 22,000 troops and 1,000 cavalry, occupied the heights above the plain. Several historians note the dangerously high morale of Pompey's army. His victory at Dyrrhachium against Caesar's legendary legions had cheered his troops, and he appears to have felt confident of victory. Pompey had, however, become an increasingly cautious commander during the months vying with Caesar. He wanted to fight a war of attrition, waiting for his ally, time, to increase Caesar's supply problems and troop disaffection, while Pompey's connections ensured an unceasing flow of both supplies and men from his client-kings in the East. He saw no advantage in risking open battle. However, as Appian notes,

As a result of the pressure brought to bear by the senators, and against his own better judgment, Pompey agreed, finally, to fight. Caesar had arrayed his forces and demonstrated for several days in the four-mile plain separating the two armies, transparently hoping to lure Pompey into battle. Pompey's forces were so sure of their victory that, afterwards, preparations for a great victory feast were found in Pompey's camp. Caesar's own army was comprised largely of ten-year veterans of his wars in Gaul, while Pompey's forces, although outnumbering Caesar's more than two to one, included slaves and scantily trained soldiers from allied kings. In addition, Caesar had no supply route by sea and was running low on supplies. By all accounts, Caesar was delighted when he realized that Pompey's had been forced to fight. Having allowed himself to accept battle when he would have preferred merely to wait, Pompey appears to have had deep misgivings about the battle; Appian says he drew up his forces with the cryptic comment, "Whichever side wins, today will see the start of terrible and unending troubles for Romans." (Appian, II, 69).

VENUS, BRINGER OF VICTORY

At the time of the battle, Caesar had elements of the VIII, IX, X, XI and XII Legions, about 80 under-strength cohorts amounting to about 22,000 soldiers, plus 1,000 cavalry and a small number of light troops. Pompey's army contained 110 cohorts of legionaries and auxiliaries (45,000 men), supported by 3,000 archers, 1,200 slingers, and about 7,000 cavalry made up levies from at least ten nations, from Gaul and Germania to Cappadocians and Syrians. Appian cites each man's password: for Caesar, "Venus, Bringer of Victory," for Pompey, "Hercules the Unconquered." (Appian, II, 76).

Pharsalus is one of history's battles where victory comes when one commander has brilliant inspiration into the tactics of his opponent. In this case, Caesar won the battle by being able to foresee precisely what Pompey would do. Pompey's most significant advantage was his cavalry, under Titus Labienus' overall command, which he massed with his slingers and archers on the left wing to drive through Caesar's troops. Caesar immediately guessed that its purpose was to envelope his right flank, and that his 1,000 horse on the right, facing nearly 7,000 cavalry, would be overwhelmed unless strongly supported. Caesar withdrew six cohorts from his rear line and posting them obliquely, disguised behind his right-wing cavalry and infantry: it's difficult to see infantry when positioned behind mounted cavalry. After a speech in which he clearly pointed out that the whole battle might depend on the courage of these cohorts - and in which he told them to strike with their lances at the faces of the Pompeian cavalrymen, who would protect their vulnerable eyes - he ordered his entire army not to move without his specific signals. In facing odds of more than two to one, everything would depend upon timing.

The steep banks of the River Enipeus protected Pompey's right flank, where he placed mixed Cilician and Spanish troops. Syrian legions held the center. Caesar placed his XI and VII Legion on his left under command of Marc Antony. Domitius Calvinus took command of the center; Publius Sulla handled the right with Caesar's beloved Xth Legion, while he took station behind Sulla.

Pompey ordered his troops to stand firm, in hopes that Caesar's forces exhaust themselves in the initial charge across the plain; however, Caesar's veterans saw the trap and stopped short of impact to rest and redress their lines. Caesar noted later that Pompey had thus thrown away the psychological effect of a charge upon his multi-lingual troops - thus losing the emotional impetus of the charge at the battle's beginning. When his massed cavalry and their supporting archers did strike Caesar's right, the shock almost broke the line and began to outflank Caesar's exposed flank. At this moment, a flag from Caesar signaled the disguised six cohorts who struck Labienus' cavalry and routed them. Once the cavalry fled, the archers were left without support and also fled or were trampled by their own horsemen, after which Caesar inexorably wheeled his troops and fell upon Pompey's now-unprotected left. At the same time, Caesar reinforced his first and second lines. This meant that Pompey's troops were being simultaneously attacked in their flank and front by fresh troops. The army broke and streamed to the rear to the shelter of Pompey's fortified camp:

At a stroke, Caesar had reassured all remaining Romans in Pompey's army that they had nothing to fear from his victory, and they apparently stood by while the balance of Pompey's allied army crumbled, broke, and ran. Pompey, when he saw the rout, returned to his tent (decorated with laurel in anticipation of his victory) and, for a time, apparently "became deranged" with depression. Caesar, rallying his men for the final effort (it was, he writes, very hot and no later than midday), personally led them up to the fortifications of Pompey's camp, and Pompey is said to have roused himself, saying, "So they're at our camp as well?" Followers urged him to disguise himself and flee; with four companions, he departed for the port of Larissa. Caesar dined that night in Pompey's tent, and Caesar and his army shared the great feast which had been prepared for the Pompeians. Caesar writes of their entry into Pompey's camp, with dry irony,

"In Pompey's camp could be seen artificial arbors, a great weight of silver plate laid out, tents spread with fresh turf and . . . covered with ivy, and many other indications of extravagant indulgence and confidence in victory; so that it could readily be judged that they had no fears for the outcome of the day." Caesar, III, 96.

The balance of the Pompeian forces surrendered to Caesar the next day. Caesar estimated the fallen at 15,000 total, of whom 6,000 are said to have been Roman citizens. Many hostile senators, including Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, died in Pompey's ranks. As he surveyed the battlefield, Caesar's epitaph on the Battle of Pharsalus was

Historians since have swung between applauding Caesar's brilliance at anticipating Pompey's tactics and excusing Pompey, badgered as he was by his senatorial clique into giving battle when the Fabian tactics he desired might well have brought victory. His battle plan was well-thought out but is lack of resolution resulted in an unnecessary and totally disastrous defeat. It was that same lack of resolution that permitted Caesar to escape to Pharsalus in the first place with his army and his purpose intact. In the end, resolution won the day.

Although many secondary battles remained to be fought, the destruction of Pompey's army (and his murder after fleeing to Egypt) essentially decided the Civil War at Pharsalus. Caesar won, and his bravery and that of his army would be lauded by many later historians. Pompey lost, and many others besides the poet Lucan would grieve that the idea of the Republic died on Pharsalus plain.

SOURCES:

Map of Palaepharsalus from J.F.C. Fuller, Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier and Tyrant. Fuller accepts Hirtius' and other historians' arguments that the battle was actually closer to "old Pharsalus" than the newer town, but the configuration of line of battle along the River Enipeus remains the same. Disposition of the armies at Pharsalus. Image courtesy of RedRampant.com. Coin struck by Caesar's mints showing African Elephant trampling its enemies (Civil War period).