Julius Caesar: The Last Dictator

"I am bound to suspect, Caesar, that your friendship is a sham and that your army here in Gaul is for no other purpose than to crush me.

So if you do not get out of this area and take your army with you, I shall treat you not as a friend but as an enemy; and if I kill you, I shall give great satisfaction to a large number of noble and distinguished Roman citizens." Caesar quoting Ariovistus, 58 BC (Saaben-Clare)

"I am convinced that, when he [Ariovistus] has understood my demands and realized how fair are my terms, he will not forfeit my goodwill or that of the Roman people. But if some lunatic frenzy drives him to make war on us, what have we to fear"? Caesar's comment on Ariovistus (Saaben-Clare).

For more than 500 years, generations of western schoolchildren have been introduced to the history of Caesar's conquest of Gaul by learning that it was then divided into three parts. The eight years of his Gallic campaigns, in which by far the largest part of what is now France, Belgium, and parts of Holland, Switzerland, and Germany west of the Rhine, were brought into Rome's provincial empire, gave Caesar the wealth, stature and power to contend with Pompey and the Senate for the dominion of Rome during the Civil War. His victories created much of his enduring reputation as one of the greatest military geniuses of history. His account of his own campaigns, De Bello Gallico ("The Gallic Wars" or his "Commentaries") is a classic of ancient history and literature and established his reputation as one of the best writers of his or any generation. The coins above, representing a Gallic warrior in horned helmet and a disheveled female captive, were made to his own orders when he was dictator of Rome. In the final analysis, Gaul made him.

What Caesar did for Gaul was to kill, by Plutarch's estimate, over one million of its perhaps twelve million inhabitants and enslave a million more. When Caesar found a provocation to carry his command into unconquered Gaul, there were hundreds of free tribes indifferent or actively hostile to Rome; when his term as governor expired, a vast new and profitable province was added permanently to the Empire, adopting Roman culture within a few generations. Gaul's romanization survived the fall of the city that conquered it. It was, and remained, one of the crown jewels of Rome's conquests. Perhaps the greatest irony of all is that Caesar initially appeared to the Gauls in the guise of a protector.

What is now Provence in France was the original "Province" held by Rome since 122 BC and was peacefully established by Caesar's day and known as "Gallia Narbonensis." Stretching beyond its relatively narrow confines on the Mediterranean towards the Baltic lay a vast interior peopled by semi-civilized tribes of whom most were of Celtic heritage, dating from invasions over several centuries. Romans called it "Gallia Comata" or "long-haired Gaul." Although once ruled by kings, by the late Republic most Gallic tribes -including The Atrebates, Morini, Nervii and Eburones of what is now Belgium and Germany, the Bellovaci, Suessones, Lingones, Carnutes and Aedui of central France, and the Bituriges, Arverni, Allobroges and Aquitani of the south - were ruled by nobles or elected tribal leaders. Although not literate, the Celts often spoke Latin, traded with Rome and other nations, had their own established coinage, were adept at agriculture, mining, and metallurgy, and had a vivid tradition of decorative arts. The Druids - about whom Caesar is our primary source in ancient history - were the ruling elite, exempt from taxation and warfare and passing down the oral tradition of religious observance and law from the highest position in Celtic society. The aristocracy ruled. Much of the rest of the people were small farmers, many more or less in bondage to their chiefs.

The Celts lived with the threat of the aggressive German tribes to the northeast, across the Rhine. When Caesar's uncle, the famous Gaius Marius, won his great victories against the invading tribes of the Germanic Cimbrii and Teutonii, their invasions were halted in Gaul. The Germans, as described by Caesar, were entirely warlike and despised the weakness of the settled Gallic tribes, frequently crossing the Rhine for plunder and to take territory if they could. It was to prevent the immigration of additional Germanic tribes that Caesar was first called to assist the Gauls; he never left.

Caesar had, after much political maneuvering, received both the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul (roughly, northern Italy and the Adriatic coast) and Transalpine Gaul (France) following his year as Consul in 59, BC. Southern Gaul, largely pacified, had been a Roman province for almost a century, officially since 112 BC. There is strong evidence that, in the beginning, Caesar thought to make his reputation not in Gaul, but in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum. It left him close to political events in Rome and, particularly in Illyricum, offered opportunities for military fame and plunder. However, a Germanic tribe, the Helvetii, gave him an irresistible opportunity in the first months of his command which had far-reaching implications for the future.

The Roman fear of the Gauls went back to the last great invasion of Italy by Gallic tribes in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC. Tribal movements led to Gallic invasions in Greece and Asia Minor (the "Galatians" of biblical fame). Around 400, Gallic tribes filtered into northern Italy towards the Etruscan settlements of the Po Valley; this was afterwards called "Cisalpine" Gaul ("Gaul this side of the Alps" whereas Gaul proper was known as "Gaul on the other side of the Alps"). On July 19, 386 BC, the Gallic army wiped out the Roman defensive forces at the river Allia, leaving Rome open to sack more severe than any suffered until Alaric six centuries later. The day was forever afterwards a black memorial in Rome's calendar. Marius' victories against the German Cimbri and Teutoni in Gaul in the 2nd century merely confirmed the threat of these northern invaders in popular fears.

Thus when Caesar learned that a great folk migration of a northern Celtic tribe, the Helvetii (originally from what is now Switzerland) planned to pass through Gaul to obtain land in the west, he was given the ideal excuse for action. The Gauls, naturally, feared that the Helvetii would plunder en route, if not take over their lands outright. Caesar forbade the Helvetii to pass through lands so close to Rome's territory. He took five hastily assembled legions into battle against a vastly superior horde, estimated as nearly 270,000 people. However, the Helvetii had their woman and children with them, which severely restricted their mobility. In a series of skirmishes and the final battle near Toulon, Caesar claims only 130,000 of the tribe were left alive. They were forced by Caesar to return to their original lands in Switzerland after a brief but definitive campaign.

Almost immediately, the leaders of several tribes, including the Aedui, Rome's allies, called on Caesar for help against the Germanic Sequani tribe under their leader, Ariovistus. One of the reasons for the Helvetian migration had been pressure from Ariovistus, whose people were filtering into northern Gaul and threatening their lands. The tribes begged Caesar to stop Ariovistus. Since the German was titled as a "Friend and Ally of the Roman people," Caesar tried to handle him diplomatically but his overtures only received defiant denials. When he moved against the German troops (near modern-day Besancon), Caesar was dumbfounded to find his own troops panic-stricken about fighting the Germans. He had to exhort the army to remember that Marius had beaten the Germans before and they would again. In a great battle (in which Caesar routed the German right wing), the Germans broke and streamed back across the Rhine. As Caesar wrote with understandable pride, "Two campaigns were thus finished in a single summer." He retired his army to winter quarters among the Sequani and returned to his duties in Cisalpine Gaul for the winter with the praises of those Gauls who had asked for Rome's protection.

57 BC: CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE BELGAE

Many scholars believe that it was not until the end of his first year in Gaul that Caesar fully realized that, having once begun, he could not safely withdraw his forces until the whole of Gaul was pacified. He was particularly aware that, before he could move into Gaul's interior, he had to secure his rear (northeastern Gaul) from German incursions, in the area of the Belgic tribes between the Moselle and the North Sea, many of which were ethnically German. He also heard while in Cisalpine Gaul that the Belgae, fearful that Caesar would turn on them after he had pacified Celtic Gaul, were arming and preparing for war. Raising two new legions (the 13th and 14th), he moved quickly to the borders of the Belgae on the Marne River.

Upon arrival, Caesar learned that fifteen tribes had united under Galba, king of the Suessiones, and planned to field 300,000 warriors. When the Belgic Remi tribe agreed to aid Caesar, the Belgae attacked their chief towns and pillaged their lands. In protecting the Remi, Caesar forced the assembled tribes to withdraw to within miles of the Sambre river. There he learned that the Nervii, fiercest of the Belgic tribes, the Atrebates and Aduatuci were waiting on the far side. The Battle of the Sambre was touch-and-go for Caesar: in the first of many battles, he was forced to personally rally his men, turning a near-defeat into victory, vitally assisted by Titus Labienus and his cavalry. The Nervii surrendered and were permitted to retain their lands. The Aduatuci, however, surrendered and then attempted to escape. In the first of many harsh retaliations upon Gauls who (in his mind) broke their word, Caesar sold the whole 53,000 men, women and children of the tribe into slavery. Meanwhile, Marcus Crassus' son had successfully moved into Normandy and Brittany and subdued the Armorican tribes. Caesar wrote that he believed his two years' campaigns had pacified Gaul and again returned to northern Italy. He was over-optimistic.

It should be noted before going further, that Caesar's brutal actions in Gaul are sometimes distinguished as singular in ancient warfare. This is untrue. The history of Roman conquest generally involved either surrender or annihilation; by definition, to be conquered meant dead warriors and enslaved women and children, with pillage of all they owned. It was only during the Civil War, when Caesar did not apply this normal standard to fellow-Romans, that his clemency was considered remarkable. His harshness towards the Gauls when they refused to accept their conquest would increase over time.

Caesar had already decided that he would invade Britain; the tribal kinships between British tribes and Gallic ones meant continual escape from Gaul to Britain of "troublemakers" and aid from Britain to rebellious tribes. To do so, he had to secure the Channel tribes, particularly the Veneti, a seagoing people. The campaigns of 56 began with Caesar, unusually, dividing his forces, stationing legions under Labienus, Crassus, Sabinus and others throughout Gaul to prevent tribes aiding his efforts against the seagoing peoples. The Veneti, with a body of British auxiliaries, had prepared for war and amassed a fleet of light, maneuverable sailing ships far more expert than the lumbering Roman galleys. Decimus Brutus - one of Caesar's future assassins - was given command of the Roman fleet. Initial contacts were unsuccessful until the Romans realized that the use of archers permitted them to row closely to the Veneti vessels and that long "hooks" could then grapple the masts of the vessels and tow away so that the masts and sails were broken off, permitting boarding. This was so successful against the fleet - aided with a calm in which the sailing vessels were helpless before Caesar's galleys - that the entire fleet was decisively defeated and the Veneti overrun. This tribe, too, was sold into slavery. The campaign took all summer and Caesar once again put his troops into winter quarters and began building his own fleet with which to conquer Britain, while he returned to Cisalpine Gaul to administer that province.

While in Italy, Caesar learned that the Belgae had invited two German tribes, the Usipetes and Tencteri, to cross the Rhine into northern Gaul in numbers supposedly comprising 430,000. They intended to ally with the Belgae. When Caesar confronted the tribal leaders, they told him they had been forced to cross the Rhine against their will. Caesar ordered them to return and they asked for a series of delays in which to consult with the Ubii, into whose territory they had been ordered.

In spite of a truce, as the two armies were drawn up in negotiations, German cavalry attacked Caesar's horsemen and gave him an excuse for a ruse of extraordinary cunning and treachery. The next day, the German leadership came in a body to Caesar to apologize for breaking the truce. Caesar put the lot under guard and raced with his army to the German position eight miles away. The Germans, leaderless and completely surprised, soon broke. The Romans chased tens of thousands of them back towards the junction of the Meuse and the Rhine. Many were killed; many, attempting to swim the river, drowned. It was an absolute, effective and inglorious victory, later much criticized by Caesar's enemies in Rome.

Caesar immediately decided to go where no Roman had gone before, to bridge and cross the Rhine. He wished to intimidate the surviving tribes who had withdrawn towards Cologne, in the lands of the Sugambri. He built a remarkable trestle bridge in only ten days (near Coblenz), crossed the vast river, terrorized the lands of the Sugambri for 18 days, withdrew the army and dismantled the bridge, and returned to Gaul.

Caesar then piled the 7th and 10th legions and their cavalry into 98 transports and crossed the Channel to Britain for the first time in Rome's history. He landed, probably on Deal Beach, on August 26. His troops were attacked on the beach by massed British chariots and warriors but successfully held the beachhead and moved inland. Unfortunately for Caesar, the high tides damaged many of his transports, after which the British again attacked. The British also used guerrilla tactics to hinder his foraging cohorts. The British were intimidated enough to give hostages and, with the September bad weather approaching, Caesar returned to Gaul. The local Morini attacked, hoping to steal British booty, but were quickly put down. Again the legions went into winter quarters, this time in Belgic territory.

Caesar, before he left for Italy, ordered a far greater fleet to be built to invade Britain again the next year and altered their design to make them more useful in British tidal waters.

When Caesar returned in the spring, he found 600 new transports and 28 galleys and ordered an assembly at Portius Itius (near modern-day Boulogne). He also found that the Treveri were treating with the Germans beyond the Rhine to attack while he was in Britain and had to march to the Ardennes to intimidate the Treveri and take hostages (many of whom he took with him to Britain). The second expedition to Britain sailed with five legions, 2,000 cavalry, and eight hundred ships. The size of the fleet - the largest until D-Day in 1944 - terrified the Britons and Caesar's landing was unopposed. Leaving ten cohorts to protect the ships, Caesar's army moved inland and rapidly overcame the British tribes, when Caesar received word that - again - his ships had been badly damaged by a freak storm. Caesar instantly recalled his men and returned to the beach to find 40 ships lost and many more damaged. He diverted men for repair and beached the ships behind entrenchments; meanwhile, Caesar learned that the British (convinced the Romans had turned back through fear) had elected Cassivellaunus their leader. He immediately set out against him, leaving his ships heavily guarded.

Caesar for the first time experienced the only type of warfare which truly threatened his successful career; the guerrilla warfare of an enemy who would not stand and fight. The very close-order drill and discipline that taught the Roman legions to battle according to plan was a hindrance in dealing with an enemy that "...never fought in close array":

"Throughout this peculiar combat, which was fought in front of the camp in full view of everyone, it was seen that our troops were too heavily weighted by their armor to deal with such an enemy: they could not pursue them when they retreated and dared not get separated from their standards. The cavalry, too, found it very dangerous work fighting the charioteers; for the Britons would generally give ground on purpose and after drawing them some distance from the legions would jump down from their chariots and fight on foot, with the odds in their favor." B.G., V, 16.

Eventually Caesar advanced to the Thames, possibly near Brentford, crossed to the left bank against strong opposition, and advanced deep into the country of the Trinobantes where he stormed the fortress of Cassivellaunus, who proposed surrender. But again, time and Gallic developments called him away from completing the campaign. The British surrender, hostages, and tribute was fixed before Caesar returned to Gaul upon word that "sudden commotions" required his presence. The conquest of Britain would have to wait almost a century for completion.

Upon his return, Caesar called a convocation of tribes at Samarobriva (Amiens); a bad harvest, and Roman requisitioning, showed discontent simmering beneath the surface. As supplies were difficult, he divided and quartered his legions at strategic points throughout Gaul, remaining himself at Amiens in case of speedy action. He delayed leaving for northern Italy. It was prescient he did so.

With the encouragement of Ambiorix, the Belgic Eburones were persuaded to attack the newly-formed legion stationed near Liege under Titurius Sabinus and Cotta, 50 miles from Cicero's supporting legion. The Gauls frightened Sabinus and his men by painting a terrifying picture of upcoming surprise attacks by both Gauls and Germans, suggesting that Sabinus evacuate to join Cicero's forces. Inevitably, as soon as the legion left its defensive fort, it was attacked and slaughtered by the exultant Gauls. Immediately, Ambiorix convinced the Nervii and their allies to attack Quintus Cicero's position, probably near Namur. In one of the most dramatic episodes in the Gallic War, Cicero was unable to get a messenger through to Caesar while he was besieged by Gauls who began to besiege him using what they had learned from Roman siege tactics.

Finally a messenger managed to get through to Caesar, almost 170 miles away near Amiens, and Caesar raced to Cicero's rescue with two legions against the enemy's nearly 60,000 men. As Caesar approached, the Gauls raised the siege and fell on Caesar's legions. Entrenching and resorting to craft, Caesar persuaded the Gauls to attack and routed them with a cavalry charge. News of the victory caused Indutiomarus, who had planned a related attack on Labienus' legion, to desist. With the loss of one complete legion and serious casualties to a second, Caesar settled down to raise new new legions from Cisalpine Gaul and borrow a third from Pompey, which arrived before the end of winter. He ordered another convocation of Gallic chiefs in Lutetia (Paris), attended by all but the Senones, Carnutes and Treveri who were obviously planning continued resistance.

Caesar then turned on the lands of the Eburones without mercy; however, the devastation did not flush out Ambiorix, who was never captured but was not seen again. As the campaign drew to a close, Caesar ordered another great Gallic convocation at Durocortorum (Rheims). Seizing one of the tribal leaders, Acco, as the remaining arch-conspirator of the revolt, he had him flogged to death in a Roman-style execution. Distributing his legions in winter quarters, he returned to Cisalpine Gaul, believing that "Gaul was quiet."

Instead, what the Gallic victories of 53 and Caesar's increasing severity had created was the one thing that had never happened before; a desperate determination by the Gauls to put aside their everlasting tribal contentions and unite to beat back the legions once and for all. More importantly, a leader would be found more capable of any other of facing Caesar.

" The situation Caesar now found himself in was critical in the extreme. His tribal allies had deserted him; the Arverni, elated by their victory, were on his rear; the Bituriges, burning with revenge, on his left flank; and the Aedui barred his front. It was of his own making; he had failed to appreciate that his strategy of annihilation had engendered a spirit of desperation, and that for the first time in the war he was confronted by a general able to exploit it. Although the Avaricum campaign had proved Vercingetorix to be a bold and imaginative leader, Caesar opened his Gergovia campaign by dividing his army. His penalty was his repulse; it had revealed to all Gaul that his legions were not invincible. One thing alone saved him - his own invincibility.

J.F.C. Fuller on Caesar's peril after defeat at Gergovia, 52 BC, p. 145.

In the winter of 53-52 BC, Caesar was in Cisalpine Gaul holding the normal pattern of judicial assizes. Rome was in turmoil following the murder of Publius Clodius and the political intrigues of multiple political factions. With his political career in crisis, Caesar suddenly learned that the Carnutes, hitherto thought largely pacified, had massacred all Roman citizen traders as well as Caesar's commissariat officer in their oppidum of Cenabum (Orleans). It was the signal. Despite the fact that six legions, the bulk of the Roman army, were quartered in the lands of the Senones, a guerilla force at once formed and began seriously disrupting the army's food supply. Related maneuvers were being handled by Gallic confederates throughout the center of France against the Roman armies in winter quarters. When word came of the uprising, Caesar crossed the Alps in late-February as well as the heavy snows of the Cevennes mountains, appearing in the center of France with his usual unexpectedness. He began collecting the Roman legions in Gaul around the region of Agedincum (Sens).

To deal with the now widespread revolt, Caesar divided his legions: he himself led six legions in the direction of Gergovia, the main stronghold of the Averni, while Titus Labienus took four legions into the lands of the Senones and the Parisii, further to the north. Meanwhile, Vercingetorix, manning the strong natural fortress of Gergovia, had secured the support of the Aedui tribe and its leader, Commius, once considered one of Caesar's most dependable allies. The Aedui for some years had served in the legions as auxiliaries and were highly valued by Caesar as his cavalry. This negotiating triumph led immediately to the massacre of Roman troops by 10,000 supposedly loyal Aedui cavalry and additional murders of all Roman citizens in Cabillonum (Chalon-sur-Saone). Caesar's efforts before Gergovia led to as near a military defeat as he ever suffered in Gaul, and he was forced to withdraw. Tribal leaders formerly loyal to Caesar began deserting with their troops to Vercingetorix. It is estimated that as many as 45 tribes joined against Rome. They torched the army depot of Noviodonum, massacred its Roman merchants and Caesar's hostages, and continued attacks on Caesar's supply lines. Caesar fell back toward the Loire, although he managed to successfully reunite with the legions of Labienus and find some breathing room to replenish his cavalry with German (not Aeduan) auxiliaries. Paradoxically for a tribe in revolt, this appears to have horrified the Aedui, who viewed the German horsemen as brutal barbarians who fought with insane inspiration.

In an historic move, the tribes had elected Vercingetorix their commander in chief and, some sources claim, King of Gaul. In this anxious summer of 52, he was maintaining his leadership position with the now-swollen confederacy with some difficulty. The tribes, long used to warring against each other for territory and plunder, cooperated only with difficulty. Vercingetorix had become convinced that a "scorched earth" policy would best succeed against the legions since, as both an intelligent and perceptive leader, he knew that numbers had not in the past succeeded against legionary discipline. He pleaded with the tribal leaders to have their people destroy their grain and all foodstuffs which might support the Romans as well as themselves during the campaign. As Caesar himself quotes the great Gaul, All you have to do...is to destroy your corn crops without hesitation and burn your granaries, knowing that this sacrifice will make you free men for ever and rulers over others." This pragmatic advice was, however, directly contradictory to the Gallic warrior tradition and was not universally followed. After inconclusive contests with Caesar at Gergovia, Vercingetorix was persuaded to invest the citadel of Alesia, the capital of the Mandubrii, as his base, and to attack Caesar's army (en route to the lands of the Sequani) with his vastly superior cavalry forces. Caesar's legions were, however, able to completely repulse the attack with the frightening aid of their new German cavalry: they proved not only of signal support to Caesar but were greatly feared by the Gauls themselves. This quite unexpected defeat led Vercingetorix to retire his army (allegedly 80,000 strong) to the great hilltop fortress of Alesia.

Caesar quickly grasped the changed situation and followed, immediately beginning on his arrival that inexorable enclosure of his enemy that would isolate Vercingetorix's army from its remaining allies. The siege at Alesia - one of the most extraordinary in Roman military history - broke the back of Gallic resistance when Vercingetorix surrendered. With the capitulation of the king of united Gaul, Caesar would spend the next two years exterminating whatever remaining resistance the decimated tribes could offer.

One final year of campaigning remained; Caesar was determined to complete the pacification of Gaul before his term of office expired in early 49. Hirtius, who picks up the final book of the Gallic Wars after Caesar, notes a distinct change in Caesar's policy of retribution after Alesia. Dissension among the Bituriges in late 52 met unaccustomed leniency. The great Gallic confederacy seems to have disintegrated back into inter-tribal raiding and Caesar aided both the Suessiones and Bituriges against the Bellovaci and Carnutes. In both cases, after his victories, he avoided strong retaliation. However, when he heard that Ambiorix was again on the warpath, he savagely stripped the country of the Eburones of whatever remained to it, to make Ambiorix's own people hate the chieftan who brought such misery upon them. He then moved against fugitives under Drappes and Lucterius who had marched south to plunder the Roman province. He cought up with them in the town of Uxellodunum (Puy d'Issolu). This stood on a plateau crowning a rocky hill rising 600 feet above the plain near the Dordogne River. While pretending to erect great siegeworks against this impregnable position, Caesar's engineers found and diverted all sources to the spring that supplied water to the citadel. Without water, the town surrendered.

Caesar had tried mercy and he had tried savagery, but his punishment of the survivors of Uxellodonum must be viewed as one of the great atrocities of warfare. He granted the surviving soldiers - perhaps 2,000 men - their lives. He then cut off both their hands. They were sent away as cripples to remind Gaul of Caesar's punishment. This was the effective end of the Gallic war.

" .the campaigns by which he subjugated Gaul proved him to be as good a soldier and a commander as any of those who have been more admired for their leadership and shown themselves to be the greatest generals.we shall find that Caesar's achievements surpass them all. He may be considered superior to one because of the difficulty of the country in which he fought; to another because of the extent of his conquests; to another because of the number and strength of the enemy forces which he defeated; to another because of the savage treacherous character of the tribes whose goodwill he won; to another because of the reasonable and considerate way in which he treated prisoners.he surpassed them all in the fact that he fought more battles than any of them and killed greater numbers of the enemy."

Plutarch, Life of Caesar, 15.

Caesar had conquered and pacified Gaul. His military reputation had soared during eight increasingly merciless years, while Pompey's star was correspondingly dimmed. The cost was, as Plutarch notes, that he "took by storm more than 800 cities, subdued 300 nations, and fought pitched battles at various times with three million men, of whom he destroyed one million in the actual fighting and took another million prisoners" [slaves]. Life, XV. The Roman province was safe; Caesar organized the new territories, permitting them to pay their own tribute (preventing victimization by tax farmers) of a relatively moderate 40,000,000 sesterces annually. He returned some 20,000 prisoners to the rebellious Aedui and Averni who, in spite of their participation in Vercingetorix' rebellion, would remain as a bulwark of loyal tribes to come. His relentless successes had decimated and enslaved whole tribes. Vercingetorix would walk in the Gallic triumph in 46 in Rome before his traditional execution. Caesar had, indeed, accomplished all that he had required of himself.

Vercingetorix, preparing to surrender alone to Caesar (in red, far distance),
hesitates before the Roman camp at Alesia. Henry-Paul Motte, 1886.

Doubts, however, have remained. Goethe spoke for many when he remarked, "We have become too humane not to be repelled by Caesar's triumphs."

Detailed discussions of Caesar's campaigns may be found at this site under Britain and Alesia. An excellent listing of Celtic tribes in Gaul during Caesar's command is found at Celtic Grounds. Map of Gaul from Athena Review, The Three Regions of Gaul. Coins struck 48 AD (under Caesar's dictatorship) celebrating Gallic victories, from Celtic Warriors. Caesar's quotations from "De Bello Gallico" as translated in James Saaben-Clare, "Caesar and Roman Politics 60-50 BC," p. 62. An interesting online resource is Maps, Intelligence and Caesar. Coin of Vercingetorix from Antiquité.