"But his expedition into Britain was the most famous testimony of his courage. For he was the first who brought a navy into the western ocean, or who sailed into the Atlantic with an army to make war; and by invading an island, the reported extent of which had made its existence a matter of controversy among historians, many of whom questioned whether it were not a mere name and fiction, not a real place, he might be said to have carried the Roman empire beyond the limits of the known world. " Plutarch, Life.

"I hear there is not an ounce of either gold or silver in Britain. If that is true, my advice is to lay hold of a chariot and hurry back to us at full speed!" Cicero, letter to his protégé, Trebatius, serving under Caesar in the first invasion of Britain, June (?), 54 BC.

BEYOND OCEAN

It is difficult for us to comprehend the shock waves Caesar's two voyages to Britain caused in Rome in 55 and 54 BC when he put a largely unknown island on the Roman map for the first time. Although it is conventional for historians to dismiss Caesar's practical achievements in his twin invasions of Britannia, the sheer panache of his boldness led the Senate in Rome to vote him an unprecedented supplicatio [thanksgiving] of 20 days, exceeding anything even granted Pompey.

Caesar's decision to invade Briton was based not only on the politics of his proconsular command in Gaul (58-50 BC) but also on the need to keep his reputation and fame green and visible before the eyes of his rivals in Rome. Like the American mission to the moon (which must be understood in the context of the "space race" with its Russian rival), Caesar's career in Gaul and Britain was mandated by his enemies' activities in Rome, his own desire for glory, and the hope that Britain would provide booty and military fame. He achieved some part of his goals, although it was apparently a disappointment that Britain, which had been rumored to be rich with gold, silver, and precious pearls, was in fact "miserably poor" (Tacitus). Caesar essentially led his troops to Britain half-blind; he knew little of its tribes, possible ports, or supply. Little was known about the island at the time, although there were a few historical references in Eratosthenes' Geography and others mentioned its tin trade (although Herodotus doubted its existence). Strabo, who has much to say about Britain, wrote only after Caesar's invasions. Therefore, Caesar's firsthand account of his invasions in The Gallic Wars is the first, and in many cases the sole, reference for Britain at this point in its history.

In 55 BC, Caesar was in his third year governing Gaul. He had fought and won campaigns against the Helvetii, the Suebii, the Nervii, and (in 56 BC) the revolts of western tribes headed by the Veneti, a tribe in Brittany with extensive trading relationships with the Britons. Some ancient sources suggest that the Veneti rebelled because they feared Caesar's conquests would interfere with their profitable cross-channel trade. Caesar knew that some Britons crossed to Gaul to fight him with their tribal confederates; equally, the Bellovaci and other tribal nobles, conquered by Caesar's legions, sought refuge in Britain. Gaul appeared pacified; it was time to cross over to Britain in what Caesar apparently viewed as a reconnaissance in force. Caesar fought actions against the Morini and adjacent tribes to secure his rear and, at the new port at Portus Itius (Boulogne) his army spent the winter of 56-55 BC building a fleet. Containing Germanic movements toward Gaul (including crossing the Rhine) occupied much of the campaigning year of 55, and it was not't until August that Caesar could turn his attention to Britain.

Word had filtered out of Caesar's interest, however, and conciliatory emissaries from British tribes had been arriving for months. Caesar sent his ally-king, Commius the Atrebate, back to Britain with these emissaries. They were to tell the tribes of Caesar's intentions and secure cooperation if possible. Instead, hostile tribes arrested Commius when he landed in Britain.

FIRST RECONNAISSANCE, 55 BC

On August 26, 55, Caesar set sail from Portus Itius with two legions (the Tenth and the Seventh) and 500 cavalry in almost a hundred transports and additional warships. Of utmost significance, the ships containing his cavalry, due to contrary winds, could not effect a landing. By 9 AM on August 27, Caesar and his ships were off the cliffs of Dover and saw massed warriors above, waiting for their attempt to land; he wrote that their javelins could be thrown right down on his troops on the beach. In response, the fleet moved off northwards, running the ships ashore on an "evenly sloping" shingle beach several miles from Dover (probably in the neighborhood of Walmer and Deal). The Britons had followed along the coast and were there to oppose the landing. The shelving beach required the soldiers, heavily armed, to leap out of the transports into waist-high waves (Caesar himself says his men were used, at best, to the tideless waters of the Mediterranean).

Facing the water and with massing natives forming up the beach, the troops hesitated in fear, but finally disembarked and formed ranks after the standard-bearer set them example. A determined charge drove off the Celtic warriors but, without the cavalry, Caesar could not follow up the victory. The defeated enemy sued for peace (according to Caesar), sending with their negotiators Commius the Atrebate, whose arrest had, they said, been a mistake. Hostages were agreed upon and the "chiefs began to come from all parts to solicit Caesar's favor for themselves and their tribes." [Caesar]

However, four days later, just as the cavalry transports were finally sighted en route from Gaul, a terrible storm blew up and scattered the transports (which limped back to Portus Itius). Much more dangerously, in the hitherto-unknown combination of high tides, full moon, and storm, Caesar's fleet was severely damaged. The majority of vessels were thrown against the shore and battered; many were unusable. At a stroke, Caesar lost not only his only means of retreat but also his means of additional supply; he had not brought significant provisions with the army, expecting a quick stay. Worse, the native chiefs quickly noted his desperate circumstances and the danger to his remaining army; a chariot attack was underway. The native leaders, "...after renewing their promises of mutual loyalty, they slipped away one by one from the camp and secretly called up once more the men who had returned to the fields." While foraging some distance from the camp, one legion was attacked, and only the cloud of dust alerted Caesar. The Romans had never before seen chariot warfare, unknown in Gaul; with some difficulty, the Celts were beaten off. Foraging thereafter had to be done with extreme caution.

During the next several days, as frantic repairs to the remaining ships began, bad weather prevented further attacks (but not the messengers who, throughout southern Britain, notified all the tribes of the Roman's vulnerability). Then another attack came, which was dispersed. The fleet had been patched up sufficiently to transport the army back to Gaul, and after accepting additional hostages from the tribes, Caesar (who knew the storms of Autumn were coming) returned the army to Gaul. All in all, except for the glory of the thing, it was an expedition full of danger and missed opportunities, although a delighted Senate awarded a thanksgiving. Yet Caesar himself

THE SECOND INVASION, 54 BC

Again, shipbuilding in Gaul occupied the winter of 55-54. By summer of 54, 600 newly constructed transports and 28 warships were ready. These were specially designed, shallow and easy to maneuver right up onto the beach. On July 6-7, Caesar returned to Britain, again landing between Deal and Sandwich, this time with five legions and 2000 cavalry.

Possible site of Caesar's landing near Deal (Walmer Beach). Image courtesy of Athena Review.

In the next two months, Caesar's troops moved far inland through Kent, perhaps as far as the site of the future Londinium, fighting small engagements all the way. The first goal was fortification of the landing site. This time, no natives were visible; Caesar learned from prisoners that the size of the fleet had intimidated the tribes. As soon as Caesar's scouts located the enemy, Caesar decided with his typical celeritas (speed) to perform an all-night march to surprise the Britons, who were massing at the crossing of the Stour. He left ten cohorts and 300 cavalry under Q. Atrius to guard the camp and the ships at anchor. A brisk action against the tribes was totally successful and a hill fort taken not far from the future site of Canterbury. However, disaster again occurred; Caesar was just setting off in pursuit of the tribes when messengers from Atrius arrived, announcing that another storm the night before had mangled the new fleet. Caesar promptly returned to the coast to find 40 ships lost and many others damaged. In the next ten days he drove the men to build fortifications sufficient to beach 760 ships inside its walls and begin repairs. Meanwhile, the tribes, alerted to the disaster, allied under Cassivellaunus (king of the Catuvellauni). Repairs completed, Caesar then returned toward the Stour to seek out the enemy, being harassed by enemy chariots on the march, attacking both infantry and cavalry in guerilla fashion. Caesar quite specifically describes the problems both his infantry and cavalry had in dealing with massed chariots, whose warriors attacked in force to smash infantry formation like cavalry, but could still dismount and fight on foot like infantry. A major battle was more successful, and the tribal confederacy dissolved in flight. The Britons ".never again joined battle with their whole strength." [Caesar]

Caesar now led his army to the Thames, into Cassivellaunus' territory. "The river is fordable at one point only, and even there with difficulty" [possibly the ford near what would become London]. The water was so deep that the troops were neck-deep in the water; but the army managed to cross and drove the enemy from the opposite river bank. Cassivellaunus disbanded most of his forces, retaining four thousand charioteers who attacked the infantry or cavalry if they strayed from the main body and continuing his daily harassment. Now, however, a new factor entered the campaign: the ever fragile tribal alliances of the native Britons.

Caesar was approached by the Trinovantes, whose young prince, Mandubracius, had been in exile "under Caesar's protection" in Gaul after Cassivellaunus killed his father, the king, in battle. The tribe wanted Caesar's protection against Cassivellaunus if they returned Mandubracius to his kingly position. After Caesar's promise, a settlement was reached. Other tribes also approached Caesar and surrendered. Cassivellaunus' confederacy was falling apart. From them, Caesar learned the whereabouts of Cassivellaunus' oppidum [stronghold], probably Wheathampstead near St. Albans. Caesar promptly marched to the oppidum and, after a major assault, killed many of its defenders and took its cattle. Meanwhile, Cassivellaunus, operating elsewhere, had arranged an surprise attack against the remaining forces Caesar had left on the beach, which was unsuccessful. Cassivellaunus now surrendered, using Commius as a go-between.

Scholars have worked out the following timetable for Caesar's second invasion: arriving July 7, the storm occurred on July 9; reconstruction of the ships was completed July 19; and slightly more than six weeks was required for the assaults following the incursion into Kent to the Thames and tracking Cassivellaunus' forces to his stronghold. By mid-August, it is likely that couriers had found Caesar from Gaul notifying him of trouble on the continent; a bad harvest and increasing restiveness on the part of the Gauls made his return urgently necessary. Mopping-up operations in Britain would have to wait.

"Caesar had decided to return to the continent for the winter, for fear any sudden rising should break out in Gaul. The summer, too, was nearly over, and he knew that the Britons could easily hold out for the short time that remained. Accordingly, he granted Cassivellaunus request for terms, demanding hostages, fixing an annual tribute to be paid by the Britons to the Roman government, and strictly forbidding Cassivellaunus to molest Mandubracius or the Trinovantes." Caesar, V, 20.2.

The army quickly returned to the coast with its hostages and prisoners. There were not enough ships to transport everyone to Gaul; waiting for cross-channel vessels that did not arrive due to storms, Caesar finally, and impatiently, crammed everyone into the ships in Britain and crossed back to Portus Itius in mid-September. He had spent just over two months conquering southwestern Britain. He never returned. No Roman force would return to Britain for 97 years. It continued to be viewed by the Romans as a half-mythical land at the very edge of the known world, unknown and savage. It would require Claudius' legions, once the wars in Gaul and Germany had stabilized, to truly add the island to Rome's provinces in the next century.

"Thus for Britain a new era had opened. The Roman empire now reached the Channel, and its menace or its friendship were ever-present political choices; for what had been done once could be done again" S. Frere, Brittania.

Caesar has made his point. There was nowhere he - and Rome - could not go. The tribes who sheltered Gallic kinsmen were within Caesar's span of retribution. They now had a conception of what war with Rome could mean. In the next century, Rome's trade with Britain increased and her knowledge of its geography increased. The Emperor Claudius would have the benefit of Caesar's knowledge when, in the next century, he invaded in force and made Britain a part of the Empire.

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