It can be argued that, after the apparent pacification of Gaul from 58-54, a second wave of rebellion began in the winter of 54-53 which would lead to the great campaigns of 52 BC by a united Gaul under Vercingetorix. The more thoroughly Caesar tried to eradicate the spirit of resistance, the more it apparently went underground. The winter attacks following his return from Britannia in late 54 were signposts of what was to come.

DESTRUCTION AT ADUATUCA

Upon his return from the second expedition to Britain in 54 BC, Caesar called a convocation of tribes at Samarobriva (Amiens); the tensions of a bad harvest, and Roman requisitioning, simmered beneath the surface. Caesar quartered his legions at strategic points throughout Gaul, remaining himself at Amiens in case of speedy action before the winter called him to his other province of Cisalpine Gaul. He had decided to disperse the armies so that no one region would fail in supplies; he also intended to disseminate the legions where trouble might be brewing. Caesar decided to remain in Gaul until he had word that all legions were safely established. It was a prescient decision.

The Gauls and Belgae noted that Caesar's legions were separated and could be attacked piecemeal. During the winter of 54/53, Ambiorix and Catavolcus of the Eburones were talked into attacking the legion and five cohorts of Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta, quartered in Aduatuca, probably east of the Meuse in the vicinity of Liege. The nearest camp was that of Quintus Cicero at or near Namur, almost 50 miles to the west. Caesar and his three legions were almost 170 miles away, at Amiens.

After an initial but unsuccessful attack on Sabinus and Cotta, Ambiorix presented himself for a parley. He painted his troops as an unwilling tool of what would be a combined Gallic and Germanic attack throughout Gaul which would destroy each legion in concerted attacks. He told the Romans that he had attacked them against his will, but that his true concern for Caesar's friendship meant he would tell them the truth; that their only hope was to flee towards either Caesar's or Labienus' camp before the combined Celtic attack occurred. While the legion remained within its strong fortifications, it was nearly invulnerable; unfortunately, Sabinus believed Ambiorix although Cotta and several senior centurions did not. Caesar vividly depicts the increasingly despairing arguments that went on throughout the night. Even more unfortunately, Sabinus' legions was green and the soldiers, frightened of Ambiorix's threats, agitated to evacuate before they could be slaughtered. Sabinus won out against all opposition. Accordingly, the legion left the next morning for Cicero's camp and was ambushed within hours and slaughtered almost to a man. The Gauls' attack sounds eerily like a native American onslaught in a movie western:

Sabinus, incredibly, attempted to surrender to Ambiorix and, upon his promise they would come to no harm, gave up his weapons docilely. He and the officers and centurions with him were immediately killed. Caesar states that the final handful of survivors, seeing no hope when night fell, committed suicide rather than fall into the hands of the Gauls, well known for torturing captives. Some men did escape to fight through 60 miles of hostile territory, reaching Labienus with word of the massacre.

The Eburones, close to the Nervii, lived in what is now central Belgium

CICERO BESIEGED

The exultant Ambiorix then roused the Aduatuci, Nervii and other tribes and urged them to attack Quintus Cicero's camp next (brother of the orator). Cicero was unaware that the Belgae were acting in concert but knew enough to be suspicious. After a surprise attack lasting several days which did not breach the camp's defenses, Cicero was approached by Nervian chiefs he knew, with the same tale spun to Sabinus - to leave his fortifications and flee because all Gaul was rising. Grisly details of Sabinus' fate were provided. Instead, after telling the Gauls that "...it was not the habit of the Roman people to accept any terms from an armed enemy," Cicero sent an urgent message to Caesar for reinforcements, and settled down to ride out the storm. Cicero immediately beefed up his defenses, constructing additional towers at speed and fortifying his walls where possible. For the first time, the Gauls (who Caesar admitted were quick learners) attempted to use Roman siege techniques against a Roman camp. They dug a fortified line three miles in circumference with towers overtopping the Roman ramparts. Cicero was unaware that his first - and all succeeding - messengers to Caesar were being captured, tortured and killed by the surrounding Gauls.

The siege ground on, with incendiary weapons burning the interior of the camp and increasing casualties. Finally, a desperate Cicero found a Nervian noble in the camp whose slave - of the same tribe as the besiegers - agreed to try once more. Cicero's message was hidden within the javelin the slave carried and this time the message reached Caesar in Amiens, who learned for the first time of Cicero's peril. Caesar immediately called on the legions of Marcus Crassus, Fabius, and Labienus; leaving Crassus' legions behind at Samarobriva to guard it, Caesar joined with Fabius' legion and raced towards Cicero. Labienus, hemmed in, could provide no aid. Thus Caesar had, at most, two under-strength legions to come to the rescue.

Meanwhile, Cicero's troops were exhausted, running short of water and food, and suffering increasing casualties. The Gauls began firing flaming brands which set the thatched roofing of the camp on fire and required those not manning the walls to form fire brigades. He had no indication that the final messenger had made it through the lines to Caesar but there was no doubt what would happen to his men if, like Sabinus, he relied upon the mercy of the besieging Gauls. But help was on the way: