By David Bender

    It is too early to assess the long-term implications of the Israeli attack on Lebanon but the potential for a lengthy, bloody conflict is high.  The chances of it spreading beyond Lebanon and destabilizing much of the Middle East are also possible.  At the same time, it is also fully possible that there will be a few violent weeks in Lebanon—with many people dying and much of that country’s fragile infrastructure being destroyed—and then a return to the status-quo.  

    First, it is important to understand Israel’s motivations for lashing out at Lebanon.  Unlike many countries, Israel is often quite candid about it motivations and goals in military operations.  Following the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah, Israel launched an aggressive military strike against targets across Lebanon.  The Israelis have stated the operation will continue until Hezbollah is neutralized.  What exactly the neutralization of Hezbollah means is something that perhaps only a few high up officials in the Israeli government understand.  However, a broad outline of what the Israeli goals of the operation could be is becoming clearer.  

    Israel is saying that its attacks throughout Lebanon, as opposed to merely hitting Hezbollah positions in the south, is because it is holding the government of Lebanon responsible for the kidnapping of its soldiers.  Concurrent with this is a call for the Lebanese government to take control of its entire territory.  It is ironic given that Israel is holding the Lebanese government responsible for actions taken in areas it is saying the government does not control.  Israel knows very well that currently the government in Beirut does not have the power either politically or militarily to assert full control over the southern part of the country.  Hezbollah acts without the Lebanese government’s consent or support—Syria and Iran’s role in this is slightly different and I’ll address that in a moment.

    Thus, why the contradiction in Israeli policy?  While some might say that Israel’s contradictory words are a sign that Israel has no real plan and it is simply lashing out, violently and unjustly at its far weaker neighbor, in fact Israeli thinking on this has a rationality to it.  Hezbollah, while not constituting any threat to the territorial integrity of Israel has been a thorn in its side for some time now.  Indeed, the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon six years ago was the only clear victory for an Arab fighting force over the Zionist state.

    The goal of the Israelis is to break the back of Hezbollah.  Hezbollah is, in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world, a heroic organization.  A significant military force within Lebanon and an emerging political force, the Israelis no doubt worry what a Lebanon with a dominant Hezbollah would look like.  Hezbollah represents the Shias of Lebanon and they are the fastest growing sectarian group in the country.  

The point of the Israeli operation in Lebanon is to demonstrate to the Lebanese government and even more to its people the cost of allowing Hezbollah to continue to operate.  It is the Israelis’ hope that if they can make life in Lebanese miserable and scary enough then there is a chance that they will see the cost of having Hezbollah as being too high.  Stripped of its role as a heroic defender of Lebanon, Hezbollah will be recast as a liability so high that the Lebanese people will demand their government comply with UN Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarming of private militias in Lebanon (meaning Hezbollah).

    The problem with this plan is that it is naïve at best and more likely utterly insane.  Tinkering with delicate political systems and popular opinion rarely works (any doubts about the unintended consequences of military actions should look no further than Iraq); and it is even less effective when the tool of choice is bombers and tanks.  This is why the Israeli operation is so dangerous for the region.  As the rhetoric blaming Syria and Iran is ratcheted up, the potential for an all-out Middle Eastern war rises.  Syria and Iran do indeed support Hezbollah, though a distinction between the two must be recognized.  It is impossible to say if Syria or Iran pushed for the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers.  

It seems very unlikely that Syria would.  Syria today is totally unprepared for any type of military confrontation with Israel.  The Syrian regime, while largely stable, probably could not survive a withering Israeli attack.  If it were able to hunker down and rally the people behind the flag there is a chance the regime could survive; but it is more likely that Syria could devolve into civil war between pro-government supporters attempting to ride out the Israeli attack and those who would see this as the chance to confront the Zionist state once again. Using the example of Hezbollah’s victory over Israel in south Lebanon, they would attack Israel using guerilla tactics and trying to avoid the total military defeat suffered by formal Arab armies in 1948, 1967, and, by and large, 1973.  This could very easily trigger revolutions in Jordan and Egypt with similar factions:  those who want to find accommodation with Israel and those who would want to use the chaotic moment to have another go at it.

This scenario ends with the perhaps a decade of war that would probably involve the United States, and more frighteningly, Russia and perhaps China in smaller roles to protect their smaller but significant interests in the region. This is not a road that the Syrian government would want to go down.  The West may have issues with the Syrians from time to time, but on the whole is it a regime that values self-preservation above all else.

 As for whether Iran is involved, there is a chance.  Ahmedinejad may be a genius or he may be a madman, but he clearly is not someone to make small plans.  With Iran coming under the grip of the international community for it’s nuclear program, a war might serve its purposes.  While such seems a little too irresponsible even for Iran’s current government, it is not impossible that they see a broad crisis in the Middle East between Israel and an Arab country as something that could both divert attention from their nuclear weapons program (or would it intensify?).  It might also be a chance for Iran to assert its hegemonic status in the Middle East.  Iran seems to drift in and out of the Middle East in terms of geo-politics.  Sometimes it is a player, other times it seems to create a critical distance.  Ahmedinejad—unlike Khatami—seems very interested in creating a large role for Iran in the Middle Eastern politics.  A crisis in Lebanon, where Iran already has influence, would be a useful tactic.

What is so frustrating is that the Israelis are walking into this trap.  Their hard-line response—to say nothing of the massive human suffering they are creating—is empowering the radicals.  It is difficult to imagine how this operation will make Israel more secure as well.  Ignoring the fact that Israel has total military domination in the Middle East and currently has no threat to its security, it is likely that this current military action will create instability in the region for a long time.  Ironically, while Israel facing not military threats, the one greatest threat to its security is regional instability.