By David Bender

    Syria is a highly nationalistic country; but its nationalism is split between a strong sense of Syrian identity and pan-Arabism.  While the ideals of pan-Arabism are still occasionally given lip service around the Arab world, it is only in Syria that the concept is still taken seriously on political and social levels.

    However, the nearly one million Iraqi refugees in Syria are challenging the country’s commitment to pan-Arabism.  Iraqis, as fellow Arabs, were initially welcomed by Syrians with open arms and treated as victims of US aggression.  However, as their numbers grew and they began to place heavy strains on the economy and society, some Syrians have begun to question the wisdom of sacrificing more for fellow Arabs at the expense of their own prosperity and stability.  For over 50 years, official Syrian policy has been that it is necessary to sacrifice political rights and economic prosperity for the cause of Palestine.  Syrians have largely accepted this bargain, but the strains placed on Syria from the Iraqis may be causing Syrians to question the wisdom of an existence based on sacrifice for fellow Arabs.

    A discernible shift in the Syria government’s policy has yet to occur.  A couple of weeks ago, the US State Department authorized the American Embassy in Damascus to speak to the Syrian government about the Iraqi refugee crisis.  Prior to that directive, the embassy has been largely prohibited to talking to the Syrian government.  In a move that was either principled or stubborn, the Syrian government replied that it would only speak with the US if it were willing to discuss all regional issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Obviously, the US is unwilling to enter into such a dialogue.  Thus, Syria is left to deal with the Iraqi refugees alone.  Arabism won out over Syrian self-interest.

    The irony of this, however, is that Syria is becoming increasingly isolated within the Arab world.  The country has long been shunned in Western circles, but in recent years it has faced unprecedented hostility from fellow Arab states.  This shift has two causes:  first, Syria has been blamed for the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who had very close ties to the Saudi government.  Second, Syria has a deepening alliance with non-Arab, Shia Iran.  Sunni Arab states are beginning to voice alarm at Iran’s growing power in the region.  Syria and Hezbollah are increasingly seen in Riyadh, Amman, and capitals throughout the Persian Gulf as Iranian agents in the Arab world.  Whispers of a Saudi plot to try to ferment regime change in Damascus are appearing the international press with greater frequency.

    The consequences of all of this are that Syria is being marginalized among within the Arab world.  A couple of weeks ago there were discussions about how to resolve the Lebanese political crisis.  Attending the talks were representatives from the Lebanese government, Hezbollah, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.  Syria, the preeminent power in Lebanon for two decades, was excluded.  Recent talks between Hamas and Fatah in Mecca again excluded Syria, despite Hamas having its headquarters in Damascus.  Increasingly, it seems Arab countries either do not care what Syria has to say or they consciously want to marginalize it.  This is very much in line with American wishes to isolate Syria, but it is not clear that the Arab treatment of Syria is a result of US pressure; rather, it seems that most governments in the region want to isolate Syria for their own reasons.

    Thus with internal pressure from Iraqi refugees, powerlessness to help to Palestinians in their struggle, and an Arab world that is quickly disengaging it, Syrian pan-Arabism is heading for crisis.  In the end, though, this could benefit Syria.  Pan-Arabism has been a noble idea since its inception a century ago, but for a variety of reasons it has been unable to deliver on its promises.  Egypt, the spiritual center of pan-Arabism under Gamal abd al-Naser in the 1960’s, abandoned the ideology a long time ago.  Syria will soon have no choice but to do the same.  

    On balance, nationalism can be a highly destructive force.  Most countries that either implode or lash out at their neighbors do it under the banner of nationalism.  But in the case of Syria, it is possible that greater Syrian—rather than Arab—nationalism could affect positive change.  Syria is not some third world basket case of a country that would have to use nationalism to distract its people from their daily suffering.  It has fairly good infrastructure, including good roads, a decent rail network, a solid healthcare system, and an effective vocational education system.  Syria has the potential to be a highly successful country.

    The country has been unable to take advantage of these things because of external policy choices.  But current realities could force change.  Convincing Syrians to sacrifice for Palestine was easy because Palestine was an abstract, but emotionally powerful cause.  Today’s challenges are more mundane, but they affect people’s everyday lives more.  Wealthy Iraqis have been buying up houses in Damascus forcing prices up some 300%; food prices have gone up as well.  Schools are overcrowded with Iraqi children.  Crime is rising with vast numbers of unemployed Iraqis in financial distress.  Areas of Damascus are suffering from massive overcrowding (the million refugees in Syria constitute a 5% rise in population in just two years).  It is not clear if the country’s infrastructure can handle this massive population growth.

    Syria’s southern neighbor Jordan is an example of a country that is trying to use nationalism to its advantage.  Throughout Jordan there are signs that state:  “الاردن اولاﹰ,” or “Jordan First.”  While this slogan is clearly aimed at promoting unity between native Jordanians and the majority Palestinian population, it is an example of a Middle Eastern country looking inward rather than projecting its frustrations outward toward Tel Aviv or all the way to Washington.  A “Syria First” campaign would be a radical readjustment in Syria policy, a reversal of nearly 50 years of official policy and a challenge to ordinary Syrians to change the way they see their identity.  But it could be beneficial.

    I was talking to a Syrian friend a few weeks ago about this notion that Syria had based so much of its identity on sacrifice for Palestine but in the end had gained neither Palestine nor domestic prosperity.  

    “My cousin was killed by an Israeli missile when he was stationed in Lebanon [before the Syrian withdrawal].  His body was so badly burned we couldn’t even bury him,” he told me.  “I’m tired of sacrificing for Palestine.  We should sacrifice for Syria.”