May 14, 2008. Cases from the Court of Appeals

GREAT RIVER v VICKERS 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Glen E. Pille, Judge.  REVERSED.  Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Baker, JJ.  Opinion by Baker, J.  (13 pages $6.50) 

  

            This case is a claim for workers' compensation death benefits and arises out of the death of Kelly Reynolds, which occurred while she was driving home after reporting for work at her employer, Great River Medical Center.  On judicial review, the district court affirmed the agency's determination that the "special errand" and "dual purpose" exceptions to the going and coming rule were satisfied.  Great River appealed from this ruling.  OPINION HOLDS:  We conclude the agency's decision represents a wholly unjustifiable application of the law to the facts.  The claimant's trip to and from work on the day in question did not constitute a special errand or serve a dual purpose sufficient to constitute an exception to the going and coming rule  We reverse.  

http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/court_of_appeals/Recent_Opinions/20080514/8-263.pdf 

 CATES v. TRUCKER SERVS. ASSOC. 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Denver D. Dillard, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Mahan, JJ.  Opinion by Huitink, J.  (13 pages $6.50) 

  

            Phillip Cates was an Illinois resident who filed a workers' compensation claim against Iowa-based Truckers Services Association (TSA) and Illinois Guaranty Fund for injuries sustained while he unloaded a truck in Arizona.  Once he determined Cates was not employed by TSA, the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner dismissed Cates's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Cates now appeals, raising numerous claims as to why the commissioner erred when he allowed TSA to rescind its prior admissions indicating that it was, for workers' compensation purposes, Cates's employer.  OPINION HOLDS:  In Iowa, it is clear that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the commissioner by waiver or consent.  Likewise, "Admissions of fact, which are contrary to the truth, and which would have the effect of . . . importing jurisdiction to a tribunal are not binding."  32 C.J.S. Evidence § 470, at 243 (1996).  Upon our review of the evidence we find TSA's pretrial admissions were contrary to the truth because the facts in this case clearly prove that there was no employee-employer relationship or contract of hire between Cates and TSA.  In light of the overwhelming evidence establishing that there was no employment relationship between Cates and TSA, we find that Cates suffered no prejudice when the commissioner decided to allow TSA to amend its admissions because, as stated by the commissioner, "[a]n admission that is wholly contrary to reality is not sufficient facts to justify jurisdiction."  As there was no employment relationship or contract of hire between Cates and TSA, the commissioner had no jurisdiction to rule on this workers' compensation claim. 

http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/court_of_appeals/Recent_Opinions/20080514/8-057.pdf 

    

FOGLE v. PELLA CORPORATION 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. Schemmel, Judge.  REVERSED.  Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.  Opinion by Vogel, P.J.  (6 pages $3.00) 

  

            Pella Corporation appeals from the ruling on judicial review that remanded Teresa Fogle's workers' compensation case to the agency for further hearing.  The court was primarily concerned with the reason for the appeal decision's "reduction" from the total permanent disability, as found in the arbitration decision, to the forty percent permanent partial disability as determined by the commissioner.  OPINION HOLDS:  The judicial review was explicitly and improperly influenced by the district court's concern about what it perceived as a reduction in Fogle's industrial disability from the arbitration decision to the final agency appeal decision.  Rather, the court's review should only have been of the final agency action.  Because substantial evidence supports the final agency determination of a forty percent permanent partial disability, the district court should have affirmed on judicial review.  We therefore reverse.    

http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/court_of_appeals/Recent_Opinions/20080514/8-057.pdf   

-Barry Moranville